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PROPOSITION | English meaning - Cambridge Dictionary

PROPOSITION | English meaning - Cambridge Dictionary

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Meaning of proposition in English

propositionnoun [ C ] uk

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/ˌprɒp.əˈzɪʃ.ən/ us

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/ˌprɑː.pəˈzɪʃ.ən/

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C1 an offer or suggestion, usually in business: He wrote to me last week regarding a business proposition he thought might interest me. I've put my proposition to the company director for his consideration.

Thesaurus: synonyms, antonyms, and examples

a suggestionsuggestionMay I make a suggestion? Keep your receipts for tax reimbursement.proposalThe proposal for a new stadium has been rejected.propositionHe wrote to me with a very interesting business proposition.thoughtI've had a thought about what we might do this summer.ideaRebecca has a few ideas about how we could improve things.motionThere is a motion before the assembly to adjourn the meeting.

See more results »

an idea or opinion: They were debating the proposition that "All people are created equal".

mathematics, language

  specialized a statement or problem that must be solved or proved to be true or not true: Pythagoras's theorem is the mathematical proposition that in any right-angled triangle, the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides.

politics

  US specialized in some states of the United States, a new plan that is voted on by the people of a state: He proposed an unsuccessful state proposition. Under Proposition 71, the state will commit $3 billion to studying stem cells over the next 10 years.

More examplesFewer examplesSo how does my proposition strike you ?I'm afraid my mother-in-law's cooking is never a very tempting proposition.Doing the walk in the rain wasn't a very attractive proposition.It's a crazy idea, certainly not one of your better propositions.I've got a business proposition to put to you.

SMART Vocabulary: related words and phrases

Suggestions & proposals

about

bounce something off someone

can't

co-sponsor

co-sponsorship

drop

imply

make noises idiom

maybe

move

mover

nod

nomination

on the table idiom

put ideas into someone's head idiom

put someone to something idiom

put something in

put something up

resubmission

table

See more results »

You can also find related words, phrases, and synonyms in the topics:

Opinions, beliefs and points of view

Ideas, concepts and theories

Guesses and assumptions

International relations: United States politics & government

propositionverb [ T ] uk

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/ˌprɒp.əˈzɪʃ.ən/ us

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/ˌprɑː.pəˈzɪʃ.ən/

to ask someone who you are not in a relationship with if they would like to have sex with you: I was propositioned by a complete stranger.

(Definition of proposition from the Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary & Thesaurus © Cambridge University Press)

proposition | American Dictionary

propositionnoun [ C ] us

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/ˌprɑp·əˈzɪʃ·ən/

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a suggestion or statement for consideration: The chairman was advised that it was a risky business proposition.

(Definition of proposition from the Cambridge Academic Content Dictionary © Cambridge University Press)

proposition | Business English

propositionnoun [ C ] uk

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/ˌprɒpəˈzɪʃən/ us

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an offer or suggestion about a business activity: put/make a proposition to sb I've put my proposition to the company director for his consideration.accept/back/consider a proposition I need more time to consider your proposition. The line, which has advanced high-speed InterCity trains, is considered to be a highly attractive proposition for the private sector. a risky/viable proposition a business/investment proposition a commercial/economic proposition

a statement containing an idea or opinion: The proposition that the real rate of interest will be lower in future because of lower and more stable inflation is a myth.

LAW

  (also Proposition) in the US, a suggested change to state law that is voted on by people living in that state: proposition to do sth A proposition to increase the sales tax by a quarter cent to fund parks projects passed by 33 votes.

See also

customer proposition

unique selling proposition

value proposition

(Definition of proposition from the Cambridge Business English Dictionary © Cambridge University Press)

What is the pronunciation of proposition?

 

C1

Translations of proposition

in Chinese (Traditional)

(通常指商業上的)提議,建議, 主張, 觀點…

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in Chinese (Simplified)

(通常指商业上的)提议,建议, 主张, 观点…

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in Spanish

propuesta, proposición, idea…

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in Portuguese

proposta, proposição, fazer uma proposta indecorosa a…

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in Marathi

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प्रस्ताव - सहसा व्यवसायातील प्रस्ताव किंवा सूचना, विधान, एक कल्पना किंवा मत…

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teklif, öneri, önerme…

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proposition [feminine], proposition, affaire…

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提案(ていあん), 修正案(しゅうせいあん)…

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voorstel, geval, oneerbare voorstellen doen aan…

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பொதுவாக வணிகத்தில் ஒரு சலுகை அல்லது பரிந்துரை, ஒரு சலுகை அல்லது பரிந்துரை, பொதுவாக வணிகத்தில்…

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(प्रायः व्यापार में) सुझाव, प्रस्ताव, कथन…

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પ્રસ્તાવ, દરખાસ્ત, માગણી…

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forslag, sag, antaste…

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förslag, affär, historia…

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saranan, perkara, mengajak berjahat…

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der Vorschlag, die Sache, anmachen…

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forslag [neuter], lovendringsforslag [neuter], forslag…

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تجویز, تدبیر, منصوبہ…

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пропозиція, план, справа…

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(деловое) предложение, утверждение, вопрос…

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సాధారణంగా వ్యాపారంలో ప్రతిపాదన లేదా సూచన, ఒక ఆలోచన లేదా అభిప్రాయం…

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প্রস্তাব, ধারণা বা অভিমত…

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návrh, nabídka, problém…

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saran, keadaan, mengajak berbuat cabul…

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ข้อเสนอ, ญัตติ, ยื่นข้อเสนอ…

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sự gợi ý, vấn đề cần giải quyết, gạ gẫm quan hệ tình dục với…

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propozycja, twierdzenie, propozycja (uchwały )…

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propose a toast phrase

proposed

proposer

proposing

proposition

propositional

propositioned

propositioning

propound

More meanings of proposition

All

value proposition

customer proposition

customer value proposition

product value proposition

unique selling proposition

product value proposition, at customer value proposition

unique selling proposition, at unique selling point

See all meanings

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response

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/rɪˈspɒns/

US

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/rɪˈspɑːns/

an answer or reaction

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Proposition Definition & Meaning - Merriam-Webster

Proposition Definition & Meaning - Merriam-Webster

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Est. 1828

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proposition

1 of 2

noun

prop·​o·​si·​tion

ˌprä-pə-ˈzi-shən 

Synonyms of proposition

1

a(1)

: something offered for consideration or acceptance : proposal

(2)

: a request for sexual intercourse

b

: the point to be discussed or maintained in argument usually stated in sentence form near the outset

c

: a theorem or problem to be demonstrated or performed

2

a

: an expression in language or signs of something that can be believed, doubted, or denied or is either true or false

b

: the objective meaning of a proposition

3

: something of an indicated kind to be dealt with

the farm was never a paying proposition

propositional

ˌprä-pə-ˈzish-nəl 

-ˈzi-shə-nᵊl

adjective

proposition

2 of 2

verb

propositioned; propositioning

ˌprä-pə-ˈzi-sh(ə-)niŋ 

transitive verb

: to make a proposal to

especially

: to suggest sexual intercourse to

Synonyms

Noun

hypothesis

supposition

theory

thesis

See all Synonyms & Antonyms in Thesaurus 

Examples of proposition in a Sentence

Noun

He made an attractive business proposition.

The other company rejected their proposition.

Her theory rejects the basic proposition that humans evolved from apes.

If we accept proposition “A” as true, then we must accept proposition “B” as false.

The election will be a tough proposition for the mayor.

Verb

He was propositioned by a prostitute.

He got drunk and propositioned a woman sitting next to him in the bar.

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Recent Examples on the WebNoun

Asking lawmakers to vote on an arena budget amendment or stand-alone bill is a riskier proposition, requiring support from a majority of legislators in both chambers to win passage.

—Laura Vozzella, Washington Post, 7 Mar. 2024

In San Francisco, where street homelessness has posed a particularly intractable problem, early returns showed more than two-thirds of voters supporting the proposition.

—Ethan Varian, The Mercury News, 6 Mar. 2024

Even in peaceful times, work at a nuclear-power plant is a high-stress proposition: Small mistakes can lead to disastrous results.

—Nataliya Gumenyuk, The Atlantic, 6 Mar. 2024

Polling for the ballot measure shows support for the measure wavering; the Public Policy Institute of California found that 68% of likely voters supported the proposition in December while in February that number dropped down to 59%.

—Andrew Sheeler, Sacramento Bee, 5 Mar. 2024

The Arizona Court of Appeals is expected to issue an opinion in the case this year, according to David Hameroff, past president of the Arizona Creditors Bar Association, which challenged the proposition.

—Stacey Barchenger, The Arizona Republic, 4 Mar. 2024

Skinny silhouettes were, in hindsight, a highly unlikely proposition for mass adoption: not just physically constrictive but also revealing to a degree that could verge on a violation of privacy.

—Jonah Weiner, New York Times, 3 Mar. 2024

While not all lean firms have all four characteristics going for them, their longer-term strategies often involve building capabilities to harness these traits and sustain their value proposition in the long run.

—Columbia Business School - The Eugene Lang Entrepreneurship Center, Forbes, 29 Feb. 2024

And as concern over rising crime grows, a new initiative to roll back the proposition has emerged.

—Lyndsay Winkley, San Diego Union-Tribune, 24 Feb. 2024

Verb

Women received lewd photos sent from male colleagues, were propositioned and followed back to their hotel rooms during travel for bank exams, with few consequences for their supervisors’ bad behavior.

—WSJ, 10 Jan. 2024

The suit alleges that a few days before the Diesel incident, Jonasson was propositioned by another supervisor at his company, One Race.

—Gene Maddaus, Variety, 21 Dec. 2023

A lot of your audience goes wild, specifically, for you—one woman propositioned you during your set, for instance.

—Jessie Heyman, Vogue, 15 Nov. 2023

At the end of the 1997-98 school year, another student’s mother complained directly to the then-principal of Cleveland High School about the teacher propositioning a female student.

—Richard Winton, Los Angeles Times, 28 Sep. 2023

But eight women told Bloomberg News that, over nearly two decades, Wright used his positions and influence to proposition female students, staffers and job applicants.

—Leah Nylen, Fortune, 28 Aug. 2023

In our second example of why these two are so good together, behold Sam propositioning his buddy about going on an another adventure.

—Jessica Radloff, Glamour, 8 Aug. 2023

Dern says to Cusack when propositioning him) and veracity an afterthought.

—Andy Kifer, Smithsonian Magazine, 18 July 2023

Donham, who was a 21-year-old shopkeeper in Money, Miss., at the time of Till's killing, accused the teen of propositioning her and lewdly grabbing her at her family's grocery store on Aug. 24, 1955.

—Tristan Balagtas, Peoplemag, 27 Apr. 2023

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These examples are programmatically compiled from various online sources to illustrate current usage of the word 'proposition.' Any opinions expressed in the examples do not represent those of Merriam-Webster or its editors. Send us feedback about these examples.

Word History

First Known Use

Noun

14th century, in the meaning defined at sense 1a(1) Verb

1922, in the meaning defined above

Time Traveler

The first known use of proposition was

in the 14th century

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'Preposition' and 'Proposition'

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Dictionary Entries Near proposition

propositio

proposition

propositional calculus

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“Proposition.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/proposition. Accessed 12 Mar. 2024.

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Kids Definition

proposition

noun

prop·​o·​si·​tion

ˌpräp-ə-ˈzish-ən

1

: something offered to be thought about or accepted : proposal

a business proposition

2

: an expression (as in logic) to be proved or explained

3

: something of a certain kind which one must deal with

the mine will never be a paying proposition fixing that roof will be a tough proposition

More from Merriam-Webster on proposition

Nglish: Translation of proposition for Spanish Speakers

Britannica English: Translation of proposition for Arabic Speakers

Britannica.com: Encyclopedia article about proposition

Last Updated:

12 Mar 2024

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PROPOSITION Definition & Usage Examples | Dictionary.com

PROPOSITION Definition & Usage Examples | Dictionary.com

GamesDaily CrosswordWord PuzzleWord FinderAll gamesFeaturedWord of the DaySynonym of the DayWord of the YearNew wordsLanguage storiesAll featuredPop cultureSlangEmojiMemesAcronymsGender and sexualityAll pop cultureWriting tipsGrammar Coach™Writing hubGrammar essentialsCommonly confusedAll writing tipsGamesFeaturedPop cultureWriting tipsproposition[ prop-uh-zish-uhn ]show ipaSee synonyms for: propositionpropositions on Thesaurus.comnounthe act of offering or suggesting something to be considered, accepted, adopted, or done.a plan or scheme proposed. an offer of terms for a transaction, as in business.a thing, matter, or person considered as something to be dealt with or encountered: Keeping diplomatic channels open is a serious proposition.anything stated or affirmed for discussion or illustration.Rhetoric. a statement of the subject of an argument or a discourse, or of the course of action or essential idea to be advocated.Logic. a statement in which something is affirmed or denied, so that it can therefore be significantly characterized as either true or false.Mathematics. a formal statement of either a truth to be demonstrated or an operation to be performed; a theorem or a problem.a proposal of usually illicit sexual relations.See moreverb (used with object)to propose sexual relations to.to propose a plan, deal, etc., to.Origin of proposition1First recorded in 1300–50; Middle English proposicio(u)n, from Latin prōpositiōn- (stem of prōpositiō) “a setting forth.” See propositus, -ionsynonym study For proposition2. See proposal. Other words from propositionprop·o·si·tion·al, adjectiveprop·o·si·tion·al·ly, adverbun·der·prop·o·si·tion, nounWords that may be confused with propositionpreposition, proposition Words Nearby propositionproportionedproportionmentproposalproposeproposedpropositionpropositional attitudepropositional calculuspropositional functionproposituspropoundDictionary.com Unabridged

Based on the Random House Unabridged Dictionary, © Random House, Inc. 2024How to use proposition in a sentenceHow tech does these things is often arcane, but what it does – the outcome – should be easy to explain, especially as a business or investment proposition.HBO’s new sex cult doc has big lessons for investors | dzanemorris | September 2, 2020 | FortuneE-commerce, at least for now, has helped the company deliver on that proposition.How Hearst UK’s e-commerce revenue grew 322% during the second quarter | Lucinda Southern | August 21, 2020 | DigidayMicrosoft still owns Bing’s search engine, Xbox’s gaming console and even MSN’s online portal, but it has become more of a business-facing tech company than a consumer proposition.5 questions about Microsoft’s plans for TikTok | Tim Peterson | August 5, 2020 | DigidayLanding pages need to communicate this proposition in a succinct way sufficiently.Studying the anatomy of a successful high-conversion landing page | Yasmine Dehimi | June 22, 2020 | Search Engine WatchAs a business, your unique selling proposition is what sets you and your competitor’s miles apart.Studying the anatomy of a successful high-conversion landing page | Yasmine Dehimi | June 22, 2020 | Search Engine WatchHowever, welcoming refugees is an expensive and potentially risky proposition for European countries.Pope Bids Refugees to EU ‘Bienvenido’; Europe Says ‘Non’ | Candida Moss | November 30, 2014 | THE DAILY BEASTIt stands for the proposition that the biological basis of procreation should also be the sole organizing principle of society.Is Pope Francis Backpedaling on Gays? | Jay Michaelson | November 19, 2014 | THE DAILY BEASTAn HIV scare, Rand Paul talking points, and a (maybe) proposition.My Bizarre Night With James Deen, Libertarian Porn Star | Emily Shire | November 12, 2014 | THE DAILY BEASTThe lack of love likely stems from DeMaio's silence on proposition 8.No Shaking Sexual Harassment Allegations for Gay GOP House Hopeful | Olivia Nuzzi | October 12, 2014 | THE DAILY BEASTIndeed, turning all doctors into employees is quite a dangerous proposition.Why Your Doctor Feels Like a 'Beaten Dog' | Daniela Drake | September 11, 2014 | THE DAILY BEASTNow the trouble with the main proposition just quoted is that each side of the equation is used as the measure of the other.The Unsolved Riddle of Social Justice | Stephen LeacockI will not, therefore, say that the proposition that the value of everything equals the cost of production is false.The Unsolved Riddle of Social Justice | Stephen LeacockIf one could languish through life in the shell of a mere beauty that life would be a good deal simpler proposition than it is.Ancestors | Gertrude AthertonBut in reality this paradox of value is the most fundamental proposition in economic science.The Unsolved Riddle of Social Justice | Stephen LeacockWhen Michael got thus far in his proposition, it was not very difficult to work it to the end.Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, No. CCCXXXIX. January, 1844. Vol. LV. | VariousSee More ExamplesBritish Dictionary definitions for propositionproposition/ (ˌprɒpəˈzɪʃən) /nouna proposal or topic presented for considerationphilosophy the content of a sentence that affirms or denies something and is capable of being true or falsethe meaning of such a sentence: I am warm always expresses the same proposition whoever the speaker is: Compare statement (def. 8)maths a statement or theorem, usually containing its proofinformal a person or matter to be dealt with: he's a difficult propositionan invitation to engage in sexual intercourseSee moreverb(tr) to propose a plan, deal, etc, to, esp to engage in sexual intercourseOrigin of proposition1C14 proposicioun, from Latin prōpositiō a setting forth; see proposeDerived forms of propositionpropositional, adjectivepropositionally, adverbCollins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 2012 Digital Edition

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Propositions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Propositions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

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PropositionsFirst published Mon Dec 19, 2005; substantive revision Fri Sep 29, 2023

The term ‘proposition’ has a broad use in contemporary

philosophy. It is used to refer to some or all of the following: the

primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other

“propositional attitudes” (i.e., what is believed,

doubted,

etc.[1]),

the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of

sentences.

One might wonder whether a single class of entities can play all these

roles. If David Lewis (1986, p. 54) is right in saying that “the

conception we associate with the word ‘proposition’ may be

something of a jumble of conflicting desiderata,” then

it will be impossible to capture our conception in a consistent

definition.

The best way to proceed, when dealing with quasi-technical words like

‘proposition’, may be to stipulate a definition and

proceed with caution, making sure not to close off any substantive

issues by definitional fiat.

Propositions, we shall say, are the sharable objects of the attitudes

and the primary bearers of truth and falsity. This stipulation rules

out certain candidates for propositions, including thought- and

utterance-tokens, which presumably are not sharable, and concrete

events or facts, which presumably cannot be false. These consequences

fit well with contemporary usage. Our definition leaves open many of

the questions dividing propositionalists: which additional roles are

propositions fit to play? would propositions have to be

mind-independent or abstract? what individuation conditions would they

have? how would they relate to facts? We examine these issues below,

as well as the fundamental issue of whether there are propositions at

all.

1. Brief History

2. Roles for Propositions: Modality

3. Roles for Propositions: Semantics

3.1 The Relational Analysis

3.2 Meanings of Sentences

4. Arguments for Propositions

4.1 One over Many

4.2 Metalinguistic Arguments

4.3 The Metaphysics 101 Argument

5. Linguistic Problems?

5.1 The Substitution Problem

5.2 The Objectivization Effect

5.3 Defensive Responses

5.4 The Syntax Response

5.5 Semantic Responses

5.6 Substitution and Objectivization Problems for Everyone

5.7 Modifying/Replacing the Relational Analysis

6. The Metaphysics 101 Argument: Deep or Shallow?

6.1 The Internal/External Distinction

6.2 Fictionalism

6.3 Two Readings for Quantifiers

7. The Nature and Status of Propositions

7.1 Easy Arguments: Mind-Independence and Abstractness

7.2 Reply #1: Truth in a World vs. Truth at a World

7.3 Reply #2: Deflationism to the Rescue?

7.4 Reply #3: Propositions as Types

8. Individuation of Propositions

9. Propositions, Facts, and States of Affairs

10. Sparse and Abundant Conceptions of Propositions

10.1 Expressivism and Moral Propositions

Bibliography

Academic Tools

Other Internet Resources

Related Entries

1. Brief History

We will attempt only the briefest history of the topic, focusing on

key episodes rather than on a comprehensive survey.

It is difficult to find in the writings of Plato or Aristotle a clear

endorsement of propositions in our sense. Plato’s most

challenging discussions of falsehood, in Theaetetus

(187c–200d) and Sophist (260c–264d), focus on the

puzzle (well-known to Plato’s contemporaries) of how false

belief could have an object at all. Thinking that Theaetetus flies

would seem to require thinking the non-existent flying Theaetetus.

Were Plato a propositionalist, we might expect to find Socrates or the

Eleactic Stranger proposing that false belief certainly has an object,

i.e., that there is something believed in a case of false

belief—in fact, the same sort of thing as is believed in a case

of true belief—and that this object is the primary bearer of

truth-value. But it seems no such proposal is seriously considered. In

both dialogues, it is suggested that thought is a kind of inward

dialogue carried on in the mind itself (Theaetetus

189e–190a and Sophist263e), and that judgment results

when the two inward voices affirm the same thing. Plato is standardly

understood as explaining false belief (doxa) in terms of the

assertion of a false statement (logos). But it is far from

clear that he takes the objects of belief to be statements rather than

simply the ordinary concrete objects (e.g., Theaetetus) and forms

(e.g., flying) which the statement is about, and still less

clear that he takes statements to be sharable between minds.

Statements, for Plato, might simply be tokens of inner speech, as

Nuchelmans (1973, p. 21) suggests.

Aristotle expends great energy in investigating what in reality makes

true statements true, but less investigating the nature of

truth-bearers themselves. In his most significant discussions of truth

and falsehood, he seems not to take a clear stand on the question of

propositions. In On Interpretation 1 16a, for instance,

Aristotle remarks that falsity and truth require combination and

separation, whether of names and verbs in speech, or of elements in

thought. However, it is unclear whether the resulting combination of

thought elements is anything other than a token thought, as opposed to

something which is the content of the token thought and which could be

thought by others, could be denied, asserted, etc.

Arguably, the first employment in the western philosophical tradition

of the notion of proposition, in roughly our sense, is found in the

writings of the Stoics. In the third century B.C., Zeno and his

followers, including Chrysippus especially, distinguished the material

aspects of words from that which is said, or lekta. Among

lekta, they distinguished the complete from incomplete (or

deficient), the latter corresponding roughly to the meanings of

predicates, the former to the meanings of sentences. Among complete

lekta they included axiomata, or the meanings of

declarative sentences. For the Stoics, only axiomata, and not

the words used to articulate them, were properly said to be true or

false. Axiomata were therefore the proper subject matter of

Stoic logic.

Lekta posed a problem for Stoic materialism, according to

which everything real is corporeal. For the Stoics, the real was

limited to that which can act or be acted upon, and therefore to the

bodily. Lekta, however, were thought to be incorporeal.

Seneca explains:

For instance, I see Cato walking; the sense of sight reveals this to

me and the mind believes it. What I see is a material object and it is

to a material object that I direct my eyes and my mind. Then I say

‘Cato is walking’. It is not a material object that I now

state, but a certain affirmation about him… (Epistulae morales,

117, 13)

The notion of a proposition can also be found in the works of Medieval

philosophers, including especially Abelard (1079–1142) and his

followers, but also among later scholastic philosophers in England,

including Adam Wodeham (d. 1358) and Walter Burleigh

(1275–1344).

Abelard distinguishes between dicta or what is said and acts

of assertion (or thinking), the former being the fundamental bearers

of truth-value. While Abelard himself seems to have had little to say

about the nature or identity conditions of dicta, his

successors took up the subject with vigor (Nuchelmans 1973, pp.

162–3). Are dicta particular acts of thinking, concrete

events or facts, or entities having the same sort of being as

universals? Each of these views is considered and evaluated in the

treatise Ars Meliduna, of unknown authorship.

A similar debate raged among the English scholastics in the fourteenth

century. Against Ockham’s nominalistic account, under which the

object of assent is a complex token mental sentence, Adam Wodeham, for

example, maintained that the object of assent is not any sort of

mental entity, nor even a thing at all, properly speaking,

nor of course a nothing but rather a being the case

(see Wood 2003, and Nuchelmans 1996, IV for further discussion of

Wodeham and his contemporaries).

One complicating factor for the contemporary reader in examining

Medieval (and later) work on the topic is that the term

“propositio” was standardly used, following Boethius, to

refer to sentences, mental as well as written or spoken (oratio

verum falsumve significans, i.e., speech signifying what is true

or false). Propositions in our sense were what was signified by these

propositiones if they signified at

all.[2]

When we turn to the early modern period, it is not easy to find, at

least in the writings of major philosophers, an unabashed assertion of

the reality of propositions. Unsurprisingly, one looks in vain in the

writings of the British empiricists. As for Descartes, particular acts

of judgments serve as the primary bearers of truth-value (although

there is considerable debate about the status of his eternal truths).

Leibniz’s cogitato possibilis have some of the

characteristics of propositions. These possible thoughts seem

to play the role of thought-contents and the fundamental bearers of

truth-value. However, it is a matter of debate whether they are

accorded real ontological status.

Propositionalists were by no means rare in the 19th century, Gottlob

Frege being the best known example. The Czech philosopher and

mathematician Bernard Bolzano also deserves special mention. In his

Wissenschaftslehre, or Theory of Science, published

in 1837, he argued for the existence of what he called

‘Sätze an sich,’ or sentences in themselves,

which he clearly distinguished from linguistic items or mental

phenomena. They are the fundamental bearers of truth and falsity, and

the objects of the attitudes. It is the goal of every science,

including mathematics, to state the fundamental true sentences in

themselves pertaining that subject matter. (This marks a clear

departure from the psychologizing approaches of many of

Bolzano’s contemporaries.) Like Frege after him, Bolzano

conceived of propositions as complexes composed of wholly abstract

mind-independent constituents (Vorstellungen an sich).

Bolzano’s work has had a profound influence on Husserlian

phenomenology and the development of modern logic.

Arguably, the three figures whose work has most shaped the framework

for contemporary Anglophone work on propositions are Gottlob Frege,

G.E. Moore, and Bertrand Russell. We will give short summaries of

their thought on the matter.

In 1892, Frege published his classic paper “On Sense and

Reference”. This paper contains his first formulation of the

distinction between sense (Sinn) and reference

(Bedeutung). Roughly speaking, the sense of an expression is

the mode of presentation of its referent, or the cognitive value of

its referent. Expressions were said to express their senses.

Sentences, too, had both referents and senses, according to Frege. The

referent of a sentence is its truth-value. Its sense is a thought

(Beaney 1997, p. 156), not a token thought, but a thought in the sense

of a proposition: a sharable content. Thus, in Fregean jargon,

meaningful sentences express thoughts.

Frege conceived of thoughts as structured complexes of senses. The

thought expressed by ‘The evening star is bright’ consists

of the sense of ‘the evening star’ and the sense of

‘is bright’. (It should be noted that this claim about

structure does not strictly follow from the fact that sense is

compositional, i.e., that the sense of a whole expression is fixed by

the senses of its constituent parts and their syntactic mode of

arrangement.) In his late masterpiece, “The Thought”

(1922), Frege is explicit about the nature of thoughts. They are not

part of the outer realm, which consists of those entities perceivable

by the senses. This Frege thinks is obvious. Nor are they part of the

inner realm, which consists of ideas. Unlike ideas, thoughts do not

require an owner (i.e., they exist even if not present in any mind),

and can be present to more than one mind. A third realm must be

recognized, he tells us—a realm of abstract eternal entities

which we can grasp by virtue of our power of thinking.

However, Frege is explicit that thoughts do act:

Thoughts are not wholly unactual but their actuality is quite

different from the actuality of things. And their action is brought

about by a performance of a thinker; without this they would be

inactive, at least as far as we can see. And yet the thinker does not

create them but must take them as they are. They can be true without

being grasped by a thinker; and they are not wholly unactual even

then, at least if they could be grasped and so brought into

action (Beaney 1997, p. 345).

This is perhaps the locus classicus for platonism in the

modern sense of that term, that is, for the doctrine that there exist

mind-independent abstract entities.

In their early writings, Russell and Moore endorse propositionalism.

In his 1903 book The Principles of Mathematics, Russell

affirms the existence of propositions, taking them to be complexes of

ordinary concrete objects (the referents of words) rather than of

Fregean senses (p. 47). Propositions so conceived are now standardly

called Russellian, and propositions conceived as complexes of

senses or abstract entities are called Fregean. In his 1899

paper, “The Nature of Judgment,” Moore affirms the

existence of propositions, taking them to be broadly Fregean in nature

(in particular as being complexes of mind-independent Platonic

universals which he calls concepts).

Russell and Moore later grow suspicious of propositions (although

Russell seems to have accepted them later as a kind of derived or

immanent entity). Interestingly, Moore’s thinking on the matter

seems to have changed dramatically during the winter of 1910–11,

as his published lectures Some Main Problems of Philosophy

reveal. Before Christmas, Moore claims:

In the one case what is apprehended is the meaning of the

words: Twice two are four; in the other case what is

apprehended is the meaning of the words: Twice four are eight…

Now by a proposition, I mean the sort of thing which is

apprehended in these two cases…. I hope it is plain

that there certainly are such things as propositions in this sense.

(p. 73)

After Christmas, Moore is more skeptical. While the theory of

propositions is admittedly simple and natural (p. 286), there are good

reasons to reject it. He specifies two problems, both having to do

with facts, a topic he avoided in his earlier lectures. The

first is that the theory of propositions suggests the

“primitivist” theory of truth, previously held by Moore

and also Russell, according to which truth is a simple unanalyzable

property of propositions. Primitivism, Moore now claims, requires the

claim that facts consist in the possession by a proposition of the

simple property of truth. This Moore now finds unacceptable. The

second problem is simply that the theory seems intuitively false:

…if you consider what happens when a man entertains a false

belief, it doesn’t seem as if his belief consisted merely in his

having a relation to some object which certainly is. It seems

rather as if the thing he was believing, the object of his

belief, were just the fact which certainly is

not—which certainly is not, because the belief is

false. (p. 287)

Russell echoes similar sentiments in essays after Principles.

In 1910 he writes that “we feel that there could be no falsehood

if there were no minds to make mistakes” (Slater 1992, p. 119),

and in the 1918 he remarks that a person with “a vivid instinct

as to what is real” cannot “suppose that there is a whole

set of false propositions about ” [Russell 1956, p. 223).

These doubts led Russell (1912) to propose a multiple relation theory

of judgment, to replace the standard two-place relational theory

(which is discussed at length in section 3.1). To use Russell’s

example, in judging that Desdemona loves Cassio, Othello stands, not

in a binary relation to a proposition, but rather in a multiple or

many-placed relation to Desdemona, loving, and Cassio. Othello’s

judgment is true when there is a fact of Desdemona loving Cassio and

otherwise false. This theory, and its contemporary incarnations, is

discussed in a supplementary document.

Moore’s doubts led him to postulate what appear to be merely

possible facts as the objects of the propositional attitudes. When a

subject believes that x is F and x is not F, the object of belief is

the non-existent but possible fact that x is F. See section 9 below

for further discussion of possible facts and their relations to

propositions.

2. Roles for Propositions: Modality

If there are propositions, they would appear to be good candidates for

being the bearers of alethic modal properties (necessary and possible

truth), as well as the relata of entailment. And if

propositions stand in entailment relations, then there would seem to

be maximal consistent sets of them. Prima facie, such sets seem to be

good candidates for possible worlds (Adams 1974; 1981). A proposition

will be true in a possible world (at a maximal consistent set of

propositions) iff it is a member of that world.

If possible worlds are understood in this way, however, it is

important to distinguish two meanings for talk of ‘the actual

world’. This may refer either to the totality of what exists, to

what Lewis calls “I and all my surroundings”, or to the

maximal consistent set which includes all the true propositions. The

latter is part of I and all my surroundings, but only a proper

part.

3. Roles for Propositions: Semantics

3.1. The Relational Analysis

By our stipulation, ‘proposition’ is used to pick out the

objects of the attitudes and the bearers of truth and falsity. One

would therefore expect that if there are propositions, they would

figure importantly in the semantics of attitude- and

truth-ascriptions. One would expect, in particular, that in

‘\(S\) believes that \(p\)’, and in ‘that \(p\) is

true’, the that-clauses would refer to

propositions.[3]

One might doubt whether that-clauses could really

refer, if reference is understood on the model of proper

names. For, that-clauses are not proper names, nor are they

noun

phrases.[4]

Still, because propositions are the objects of the attitudes and the

bearers of truth, mustn’t they somehow be semantically

associated with ascriptions of attitudes and of truth? Following

Jeffrey King (2002), we will use the term ‘designate’ as a

catch-all covering any sort of semantic association between a

linguistic item and an entity. We follow standard terminology in using

the word ‘express’ to pick out the relation between a

predicate and the property which is its sense or semantic content.

More carefully, then, the propositionalist will find it natural to

accept the following account of attitude-ascriptions:

The Relational Analysis of Attitude Ascriptions:

An attitude ascription ‘\(S\) \(V\)s that \(p\)’ is

true iff ‘\(S\)’ designates a person who stands in the

attitude relation expressed by ‘\(V\)’ to the proposition

designated by ‘that \(p\)’ (and false iff

‘\(S\)’ designates a person who doesn’t stand in

such relation to such a proposition).

Analogously, there is:

The Property Analysis of Truth-Ascriptions:

‘That \(p\) is true’ or ‘it is true that

\(p\)’ is true iff the proposition designated by ‘that

\(p\)’ has the property expressed by ‘true’.

One of the great advantages of these analyses—the combination of

which we will simply call The Relational Analysis—is

the smooth explanation of the validity of certain inferences.

Consider, for example:

Charles believes everything Thomas said.

Thomas said that cats purr.

So, Charles believes that cats purr.

Something Barbara asserted is true.

Nothing John denied is true.

So, something Barbara asserted John did not deny.

John believes that every even is the sum of two primes.

Goldbach’s Conjecture is that every even is the sum of two

primes.

So, John believes Goldbach’s Conjecture.

These inferences are valid if they have the following simple logical

forms:

For all \(x\) such that Thomas said \(x\), Charlie believes \(x\).

Thomas said \(A\).

So, Charlie believes \(A\).

Some \(x\) such that Barbara asserted \(x\) is true.

No \(x\) such that John denied \(x\) is true.

So, some \(x\) such that Barbara asserted \(x\) is such that John did

not deny \(x\).

John believes \(A\).

Goldbach’s Conjecture is \(A\).

So, John believes Goldbach’s Conjecture.

We will discuss problems for the Relational Analysis in Section

5.[5]

3.2. Meanings of Sentences

Propositions are also commonly treated as the meanings or, to use the

more standard terminology, the semantic contents of

sentences, and so are commonly taken to be central to semantics and

the philosophy of language. However, there is room for doubt about

whether propositions are the right sort of entity for the job (Lewis

1980). Here is why. Note that a sentence would appear to contribute

the same content regardless of whether it occurs as a proper part of a

larger sentence. So, a sentence such as ‘in the past, Reagan was

president’ would seem to be true depending on whether the

content of ‘Reagan is president’ is true at some past

time. But this would seem to imply that this content must lack

temporal qualification—that it can change in its truth-value

over time. Similarly, it seems there are locative sentential operators

‘in Chicago, it is raining’. If so, then by a similar

argument, it would seem that the content of ‘it is

raining’ would have to lack spatial qualification. The problem

is this: it seems propositions, being the objects of belief,

cannot in general be spatially and temporally unqualified. Suppose

that Smith, in London, looks out his window and forms the belief that

it is raining. Suppose that Ramirez, in Madrid, relying on

yesterday’s weather report, awakens and forms the belief that it

is raining, before looking out the window to see sunshine. What Smith

believes is true, while what Ramirez believes is false. So they must

not believe the same proposition. But if propositions were generally

spatially unqualified, they would believe the same proposition. An

analogous argument can be given to show that what is believed must not

in general be temporally unqualified.

If these worries are well-taken, then the meanings or contents of

sentences are not in general propositions.

Appealing to recent work in linguistics, Jeffrey C. King (2003)

presents evidence against one of the crucial assumptions of the above

arguments, that there are no genuine locational or temporal operators

in English. King claims that ‘somewhere’ and

‘sometimes’ are better regarded as quantifiers over

locational and temporal entities (i.e., either locations and times

themselves or locational or temporal properties of events). Thus,

‘somewhere, it is raining’ would have the logical form

‘there is some location \(L\) such that it is raining at

\(L\)’. King further argues that tenses are best analyzed as

quantifiers over times rather than temporal operators. ‘John

flunked chemistry’, thus, would have the form ‘there is

some time \(t\) within \(I^*\) such that John flunks chemistry at

\(t\)’, where the interval \(I^*\) is contextually supplied.

These analyses, of course, require the controversial claim that

predicates like ‘is raining’ and ‘flunks ’

include extra argument places for locations and times.

King emphasizes that his argument is thoroughly empirical. It relies

on results from empirical linguistics. If King is right, however, the

view that the contents of sentences are propositions can be

maintained.

For other criticisms of Lewis’s argument, see Richard (1982),

Salmon (1989) and Cappelen and Hawthorne (2010). Brogaard (2012)

provides a defense of the temporalist view of

propositions.[6]

4. Arguments for Propositions

4.1 One over Many

One familiar argument for propositions appeals to commonalities

between beliefs, utterances, or sentences, and infers a common entity.

Thus, it has been suggested, less in print perhaps than in

conversation, that propositions are needed to play the role of being

what synonymous sentences have in common, what a sentence and its

translation into another language have in common, etc.

Arguments of this sort are typically met with the following reply:

commonalities do not necessarily require common relations to a single

entity. Two red things have something in common, in that they are both

red, but it does not follow that they bear a common relation

to a single entity, the universal of redness. Similarly, two

sentences, in virtue of being synonymous, can be said to have

something in common, but that fact alone does not entail they are

commonly related to a proposition. When a relation \(R\) is symmetric

and reflexive with respect to a certain domain, it may be useful to

speak of the things in the domain which bear \(R\) to one another as

“having something in common”, but nothing of ontological

significance follows. Thus, the conclusion is drawn: we need an

argument for thinking that commonalities require common relations to a

single entity.

4.2 Metalinguistic Arguments

One standard sort of argument for propositions is metalinguistic.

Thus, many argue that we think of that-clauses as designating

expressions if we are to explain how certain argument patterns (such

as those considered in Section 2) are valid and in fact have sound

instances (Horwich 1990, Higginbotham 1991, Schiffer 1996, Bealer

1998). Since some of these sound argument instances contain as

premises sentences attributing truth to the designata of

that-clauses, those designata must be bearers of

truth-values. Similarly, premises of some of these sound instances

ascribe attitudes toward the designatum of a that-clauses,

these designata would seem to be objects of attitudes. In brief, in

order to explain these facts about validity and soundness, it seems

that-clauses must not only designate but must designate

entities fitting the propositional role.

Whether propositions are needed for the semantics of natural language

is a matter of continuing dispute. For more on these matters, see the

entry on

theories of meaning.

4.3 The Metaphysics 101 Argument

Our focus here will be on a different sort of argument. Here is a

speech the basic character of which should be familiar to

undergraduate students of metaphysics:

When someone has a belief, we can distinguish what she

believes from her believing it. I have a belief that

Homer wrote The Iliad, for example. We can distinguish

what I believe in believing that Homer wrote The

Iliad—the content of my belief—from my believing

that Homer wrote The Iliad. What I believe in believing this is

something you believe, too. What we both believe is the proposition

that Homer wrote The Iliad. This same proposition may be

asserted, doubted, etc. And, in fact, this proposition is true: Homer

wrote The Iliad. So, there are propositions, and they are the

contents of beliefs and other attitudes and they are the bearers of

truth and falsity.

One might attempt to regiment these remarks, somewhat artificially, to

take the form of an argument, which we will dub the Metaphysics

101 argument:

With respect to any belief, there is what is believed and

the believing of it, and these are distinct.

What is believed is something that may be rejected, denied,

disbelieved, etc. by multiple subjects, and is something that may be

true or false.

There are beliefs.

So, there are propositions (i.e, sharable objects of the attitudes

and bearers of truth-values).

Further tinkering might improve the argument in certain ways. Our

concern, however, is whether the argument goes seriously awry.

The Metaphysics 101 Argument is not metalinguistic. It does not rely

on premises about English. This can be verified by noting that the

argument looks just as good after it is translated into other

languages. Nevertheless, it might be claimed that the argument derives

its apparent force from a seductive mistake about how English (and

other languages) function. Perhaps this is another case of what

Wittgenstein called “language on

holiday.”[7]

5. Linguistic Problems?

How might one reply to the arguments for propositions just discussed?

One might reply, of course, by arguing for the opposite conclusion.

Thus, many have argued, on broadly naturalistic grounds, that we ought

not accept propositions. Any such argument will involve controversial

claims about the nature and status of propositions. These issues are

discussed in section 7. However, one increasingly popular reply to

arguments for propositions is to argue, (1), that they presuppose the

Relational Analysis, and (2), that the Relational Analysis does a poor

job of accounting for certain linguistic data.

5.1 The Substitution Problem

The problem here is quite simple. If, as the Relational Analysis

entails, attitude-ascriptions of the form ‘\(S\) \(V\)s that

\(p\)’ assert relations to propositions, then we should be able

to replace ‘that \(p\)’ with ‘the proposition that

\(p\)’ without affecting truth-value. But in general we

can’t do this. Therefore, the Relational Analysis is false. Here

are some examples of failed substitutions:

1.

I insist that it will snow this year. (TRUE)

*2.

So, I insist the proposition that it will snow this year.

3.

I imagine that it will snow this year. (TRUE)

4.

So, I imagine the proposition that it will snow this year.

(FALSE)

5.

I remember that combustion produces phlogiston. (FALSE)

6.

I remember the proposition that combustion produces phlogiston.

(TRUE).

The class of attitude verbs for which substitution problems

arise—the “problematic” attitude verbs—can be

divided into two subclasses: one consisting of verbs which do not

grammatically tolerate substitutions (e.g., intransitive verbs such as

‘insist’, ‘complain’, ‘say’, and

VPs of the form ‘Aux Adj’, such as ‘is

pleased’, ‘was surprised’); the other consisting of

verbs which grammatically tolerate substitutions but for which

truth-value is not necessarily preserved (e.g., ‘expect’,

‘anticipate’, ‘bet’, ‘gather’,

‘judge’, ‘claim’, ‘maintain’,

‘hold’, ‘feel’, ‘remember’,

‘know’, ‘recognize’, ‘find’).

Friederike Moltmann (2003) dubs this problem the Substitution

Problem. (See also Vendler 1967, Prior 1971, Parsons 1993, Bach

1997, McKinsey 1999, Recanati 2000, King 2002, Moffett 2003, Harman

2003.)

5.2 The Objectivization Effect

Closely related to the Substitution Problem is what Moltmann (2003, p.

87) calls the Objectivization Effect, or objectivization.

Substitutions in some cases seem to force a new reading for the verb,

an object reading rather than a content reading.

Thus, in ‘I imagine that it will snow this year,’

‘imagine’ has the content reading (this is, by

stipulation, what the content reading is!), whereas in ‘I

imagine the proposition that it will snow this year,’

‘imagine’ takes an object reading—it expresses the

same relation that holds between subjects and garden variety objects

such as those designated by NPs like ‘19th-century Wessex’

and ‘my college roommate’.

The problem here can be described as follows. If the Relational

Analysis is true, then propositional attitudes are relations to

propositions; but then it seems very odd that we should be unable to

retain the content meaning by substituting ‘the proposition that

\(p\)’ for ‘that \(p\)’.

5.3 Defensive Responses

Defensive Response #1. The above arguments against the

Relational Analysis prove too much. Similar problems arise for the

appeal to facts (as distinct from true propositions), properties, and

events in semantics. Here are several examples of substitution

failures.

\(S\) found that the room was a mess.

So, \(S\) found the fact that the room was a mess.

Freedom is on the march.

So, the property of freedom is on the march.

I jumped a jump.

So, I jumped an event (of jumping).

A difficulty for Defensive Response #1 is that it seems to spread a

problem around rather than solve it. One might argue that relational

analyses invoking propositions, facts, properties, and events all make

the same mistake of reading too much ontology into English.

Defensive Response #2. From ‘\(S\) believes that

\(p\)’ we can infer ‘\(S\) believes the

proposition that \(p\)’ and ‘\(S\) believes a

proposition.’ And the same goes for ‘reject’,

‘assert’, ‘deny’, and many other attitude

verbs. If we concede that these sentences assert relations to

propositions, then we are conceding that there are propositions.

Apart from such defensive replies, though, the relationalist might

attempt to solve the problems. We will discuss several approaches.

5.4 The Syntax Response

Next, following Jeffrey King (2002), the propositionalist might give a

purely syntactic answer to the problems. King (pp. 345–6)

claims, first, that there is a very simple syntactic explanation for

the substitution failures that produce ungrammaticalities: such verbs

don’t take NP complements at all, and so don’t take

nominal complements, which are NP complements. (A verb can take

that-clause complements without taking NP complements,

because that-clauses are not NPs.) One might say something

similar, for example, about why we cannot substitute descriptions for

names in apposition (e.g., ‘The philosopher Plato believed in

universals’ is true but ‘the philosopher the teacher of

Aristotle believed in universals’ is not true.) King claims,

second, that the other class of failures are explained by shifts in

verb meanings (i.e., because of objectivization). These shifts are due

to syntactical matters, in particular the syntactic category of the

verb complement. If the complement is an NP, the verb has an object

meaning. If it is a that-clause, it has the content meaning.

King recognizes the need for qualifications: verbs in the problematic

class can have the content reading with certain special NPs, e.g.,

quantifiers (‘everything Bill holds, Bob holds’), and

anaphoric pronouns (‘I hold that, too’.). In the final

analysis, King claims only that all the syntactic properties of the

complement (and not just its general syntactic category) determine the

verb’s meaning when taking that

complement.[8]

5.5 Semantic Responses

The relationalist might respond by making claims about the semantics

of that-clauses, ‘the proposition that \(p\)’, or

some combination of these. We discuss two such proposals here.

First, the relationalist might claim that-clauses are

ambiguous, and in particular that they pick out different kinds of

entities depending on which attitude verb they complement. How do we

tell what kinds of entities are picked out? We look at substitution

failures. Thus, it might be argued the truth of ‘\(S\) remembers

that \(p\)’ requires that the subject bear the remembering

relation to a fact, rather than a proposition. After all,

‘remember’ shows substitution failures for ‘the

(true) proposition that \(p\)’ but not for ‘the fact that

\(p\)’.

However, there are obstacles to this response. For one thing, some

attitude verbs seem not to permit substitutions no matter which

nominal complement is chosen. King (2002) gives the example of

‘feel’. What sorts of entities, then, do

that-clauses designate when they complement

‘feel’? No answer is possible. Is the Relational Analysis

therefore false of such verbs? Perhaps even more damaging, there are

verbs which are near synonyms of ‘believes’, at least in

attitude ascriptions, and which grammatically take NP complements, but

which exhibit substitution failures and objectivization.

‘Feel’ is one example, as are ‘maintain’,

‘hold’, ‘judge’, ‘expect’, and

‘suspect’. How could ‘believes’ designate a

relation to propositions in attitude ascriptions but these verbs not?

Consider also the near-synonyms ‘assert’ and

‘claim’.

Even if the ambiguity hypothesis cannot provide the propositionalist

with a general solution to the Substitution Problem and the

Objectivization Effect, it may help in explaining other

linguistic phenomena, such as the distributional differences between

various nominal complements (‘the fact that \(p\)’,

‘the proposition that \(p\)’, ‘the possibility that

\(p\)’, etc.). (See Vendler 1967 and Moffett 2003.)

Nebel (2019) proposes an alternate strategy. He maintains the

traditional view that that-clauses designate propositions,

but argues that ‘the proposition that \(p\)’ does not.

Call phrases of the form ‘the proposition that \(p\)’

proposition descriptions. Proposition descriptions, on this

view, denote propositional concepts—functions from

situations to propositions. This is motivated by a puzzle from Partee

(1974):

The number of insect species on Earth is increasing.

The number of insect species on Earth is 5.5 million.

Therefore, 5.5 million is increasing.

To explain this argument’s invalidity, Montague (1973) argued

that ‘the number of insect species’ does not denote a

number, but an individual concept—a function from situations

(world-time pairs) to individuals (in this case, a number). The copula

in the second premise specifies, rather than equates, the value of the

individual concept relative to this situation.

Nebel presents an analogous puzzle involving a proposition-like

description:

The evidence that vaccines cause autism is that vaccines contain

thiomersal

The evidence that vaccines cause autism is scant.

Therefore, that vaccines contain thiomersal is scant.

To explain the invalidity of this argument, Nebel claims that

‘the evidence that \(p\)’ does not denote a proposition,

but a propositional concept—a function from situations to the

proposition that provides evidence for \(p\) in that situation. The

‘is’ of the first premise again specifies the proposition

that is the value of the propositional concept in that situation; it

does not state an identity between ‘the evidence that

\(p\)’ and ‘that \(q\)’. In general, all proposition

descriptions are said to denote propositional concepts. In the case of

‘the proposition that \(p\)’, the propositional concept is

a constant function that designates the same proposition in every

situation.

Nebel supports this view by noting particular uses of proposition

descriptions. Compare the following pairs of statements:

1.

a.

The teacher explained the cause of World War I.

b.

The teacher explained the assassination of Franz Ferdinand.

2.

a.

Sally explained that Fido barks.

b.

Sally explained the proposition that Fido barks.

The members of each pair have different truth conditions, despite the

assassination of Franz Ferdinand being the cause of WWI, and the

proposition that Fido barks being the denotation of ‘that Fido

barks’. To explain this, Nebel appeals to the notion of a

concealed question; in certain contexts—for instance,

when the complement of ‘explains’ is a noun

phrase—the meaning of the noun phrase is given by an

interrogative clause. Thus, (1a) means that the teacher explained

what caused World War I. In the same way, the proposition

description in (2b) conceals a question, although it is a murkier, and

often context-sensitive, matter exactly which question is concealed.

Nebel suggests that Sally explained what the proposition that Fido

barks is, means, or involves.

If proposition descriptions sometimes function as concealed questions,

then it is plausible that they share a semantics with interrogative

clauses. Interrogative clauses have been taken to denote question

intensions, functions from situations to propositions that truly

answer the question in that situation. If this is correct, then

question intensions are just propositional concepts. Nebel takes this

to provide evidence for his view: If proposition descriptions denote

propositional concepts (and not propositions), then we should predict

that proposition descriptions can be used as concealed questions in

contexts which permit interrogative complements, which is what we

find.

Since ‘that \(p\)’ and ‘the proposition that

\(p\)’ denote different entities, Nebel’s proposal seems

able to explain the substitution failures that result from replacing

proposition descriptions for that-clauses. It would seem,

however, that on his view inferences from ‘S believes that

\(p\)’ to ‘S believes the proposition that \(p\)’

will be invalid. Nebel gives a tentative response that

‘believes’ may be polysemous. Compare the following:

3.

Sally believes that Fido barks.

4.

Sally believes the proposition that Fido barks.

5.

Sally believes her mother.

In (3), ‘believes’ takes a proposition as argument and

returns a predicate that is true of Sally iff she believes that

proposition. In cases like (3), ‘believes’ takes a

non-propositional entity (her mother) as argument and forms a

predicate that is true of Sally iff she believes some

contextually-salient proposition that is associated with her mother.

Nebel proposes that (2) is like (3); in this case, the

contextually-salient proposition associated with the propositional

concept is that Fido barks. Thus, (1) and (2) have the same truth

conditions, despite the that-clause and proposition

description denoting different entities.

One may object that many descriptions which denote proposition-like

entities (statements, rumors, claims, etc.) can take predicates that

don’t apply to abstract objects like propositional concepts. For

example, in the sentence ‘the rumor that Jim consumes peyote is

vicious,’ the description ‘the rumor that Jim consumes

peyote’ is said to denote the function from situations to the

proposition rumored at that situation. But it seems to be a category

mistake to say that a propositional concept (or even a proposition) is

vicious. Similarly, van Elswyk (2022) appeals to points made by

Moltmann (2013) that certain descriptions permit causal predicates, as

in ‘the statement that durian is pungent caused

astonishment’. On Nebel’s view, ‘the statement that

\(p\)’ denotes a propositional concept. But if propositional

concepts are abstract, then they cannot enter into causal relations.

On a more natural reading, the description designates an act of

stating (or perhaps its product, as Moltmann maintains), which can be

a cause.

Finally, we may ask whether this view can explain the Objectivization

Effect. If proposition descriptions denote propositional concepts, and

these are functions from situations to propositions, then why do we

get the object readings with proposition descriptions? For ‘the

number of insect species is increasing’ we do not get an object

reading for the NP, but a “structural” reading that makes

sense if ‘the number of insects’ denotes an individual

concept. The same applies to ‘the evidence that vaccines cause

autism is scant’. However, in ‘John fears the proposition

that a bear is behind the tree’, we do not get a structural

reading. John does not fear the function itself, nor any structural

feature of it. We get an objectual reading of the sort King

predicts.

5.6 Substitution and Objectivization Problems for Everyone?

Although the dominant view in the literature is that the

Substitution Problem and the Objectivization Effect

are problems principally for defenders of the Relational Analysis

(e.g., Prior 1971, Bach 1997, Recanati 2000, Moltmann 2003; 2004), it

is intriguing to ask whether some version of these problems arise for

everyone—friend or foe of the Relational Analysis,

friend or foe of propositions.

As noted above, there are near-synonyms (e.g., the verbs

‘assert’ and ‘claim’) which are alike in

taking nominal complements but which differ with respect to

substitutions. This seems to be a fact that everyone must explain. It

seems likely that the substitutional differences must be explained in

terms of shifts in verb meaning. Because substitution does not affect

the meaning of ‘assert’, it must affect the meaning of

‘claim’, and, intuitively, it does. This does leave the

question of how the Objectivization Effect itself is to be

explained. But one might hope that a broadly syntactic

solution—perhaps like King’s—would be available to

anyone, regardless of one’s stance on propositions.

If these problems are problems everyone faces, some heat is taken off

the relationalist, and the propositionalist generally.

That said, the relationalist may have to take account of other

linguistic puzzles. She will need to explain why it sounds so

peculiar, e.g., to talk of “my believing what you desire, or my

dreading what the thermometer indicated.” And, even with purely

cognitive attitude verbs, similar puzzles arise: the mild peculiarity

of “I doubt/assert what you contemplate/entertain,” for

example, will require explanation. (For more on these matters, see

Vendler 1967 and Harman 2003.)

5.7 Modifying/Replacing the Relational Analysis

Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, the linguistic problems

discussed above undermine the Relational Analysis. Can a

propositionalist dissociate herself from that analysis, and its

linguistic difficulties, while still endorsing the arguments we

discussed for propositions in section 5.1?

Some modifications of the Relational Analysis do not avoid the

linguistic problems. For instance, it is not enough to claim that

attitude verbs designate three-place relations between

subjects, propositions, and modes of presentation.

One possibility is to deny that attitude verbs designate relations

when complemented by that-clauses, and to claim that they

rather make a syncategorematic semantic contribution. Under one

approach, that-clauses in attitude ascriptions designate

propositions which serve to “measure” attitudes conceived

of as mental particulars (Matthews 1994). It is not clear that this

view will be immune to substitution and objectivization problems. See

Moltmann (2003) for further discussion.

Another possibility is to abandon the Relational Analysis altogether,

in favor of a version of Bertrand Russell’s “multiple

relation” theory. Following Russell (1911; 1913; 1918), Newman

(2002) and Moltmann (2003; 2004), have recently argued that

that-clauses in attitude ascriptions do not designate

propositions but rather provide a number of entities as terms of a

“multiple” attitude relation. These philosophers

nonetheless do accept propositions, and use them to explain sentences

in which ‘proposition’ explicitly occurs, e.g.,

(‘Some proposition that John believes is true’,

‘John believes the proposition that snow is white’). The

basic idea is that there are propositions, but they have the status of

“derived objects”—derived from our attitudes, which

themselves are not relations to propositions. It is an interesting

question whether a Russellian is positioned to endorse the arguments

for propositions given in section 4. (For more on the Russellian

theory, see the supplementary document:

The Multiple Relation Theory

An alternate proposal which abandons the Relational Analysis takes

that-clauses to be predicates. Van Elswyk (2020) argues that

this explains why that-clauses can compose with nouns, as in

‘the belief that snow is white’, as well as why

that-clauses can follow the adverb ‘now’, as in

‘now that Giannis will be named MVP, Giannis will be offered a

supermax contract’. In the first case, the that-clause

specifies the content of the attitude denoted by the noun phrase (e.g.

‘the belief’). In the second case, the use of

‘now’ contributes the information that the event \(e_1\)

described in the main clause occurs after the event \(e_2\) following

‘now’. The that-clause serves as a predicate that

is satisfied by \(e_2\). Even rejecting the Relational Analysis, van

Elswyk finds a need for propositions as meanings of sentences and the

things designated by certain names (e.g. ‘logicism’),

proposition descriptions, and propositional anaphors, such as

‘so’, ‘yes’, and ‘no’.

Trueman (2021) rejects the Relational Analysis in favor of a

prenective view of attitude reports inspired by Prior (1971).

Whereas the Relational Analysis treats the attitude verb \(V\) in

ascriptions of the form ‘\(S\) \(V\)s that \(p\)’ as

contributing a dyadic relation between \(S\) and the proposition

designated by ‘that \(p\)’, this view treats V as

prenective, meaning that it acts as a predicate at one end and a

sentential connective at the other. So, the prenective view denies

that ‘that \(p\)’ is a singular term, instead parsing our

ascription as ‘[\(S\)] \(V\)s that [\(p\)]’, where

‘\(p\)’ is a sentence that expresses the proposition

content of S’s attitude. In denying that that-clauses

are singular terms, Trueman avoids reifying propositions, and instead

identifies propositional contents as truth-conditions of sentences.

Thus, to believe the proposition that \(p\) is to stand in the

believing relation to the truth-condition of ‘\(p\)’.

One might worry that the prenective parsing of belief reports clashes

with the syntactic data that motivated treating that-clauses

as singular terms in the first place. After all, instead of

‘Simon believes that Sharon is funny’, we may say

‘that Sharon is funny is what Simon believes’, where the

complementizer ‘that’ moves with ‘Sharon is

funny’ rather than staying put with ‘believes’.

Trueman responds in two parts. First, the mere fact that

that-clauses are syntactic units does not imply anything

semantic about them—viz., that they are singular terms.

(Hofweber 2016 gives a sustained defense of this point.) Second, he

modifies the proposal from Prior’s original parsing; rather than

‘[\(S\)] \(V\)s that [\(p\)]’, attitude ascriptions are

parsed as ‘[\(S\)] \(V\)s [\(p\)]’. The complementizer

‘that’ is semantically vacuous, but functions to indicate

that ‘Sharon is funny’ is a complement of

‘believes’ rather than occurring as a standalone sentence.

6. The Metaphysics 101 Argument: Deep or Shallow?

We have suggested that the most promising arguments for propositions

are the metalinguistic arguments and the Metaphysics 101 argument. The

former arguments are plainly theoretical: they appeal to the

explanatory power of semantical theories invoking propositions. To

resist them, there is no need to explain away their intuitive appeal,

because they do not and are not intended to have intuitive appeal.

This is not true of the Metaphysics 101 argument. It is thoroughly

intuitive, and so resisting the argument requires giving a story about

how and why intuition goes wrong. In this section, we will consider

one general strategy for doing this.

The Metaphysics 101 argument can seem Janus-faced: its premises seem

utterly shallow, and yet its conclusion seems to resolve a deep

ontological debate. One is apt to think, “Sure, what I believe

is different from my believing it. And so we can distinguish the

content of a belief from the attitude of belief. These contents are

propositions. Fine, but now it seems there must be a domain of

entities here, whose nature remains to be investigated. How could that

be?” One might suspect some sort of equivocation or ambiguity is

at work, some oscillation between a shallow and a deep

interpretation.

6.1 The Internal/External Distinction

Rudolf Carnap’s (1956) distinction between internal and external

questions may prove relevant here. For Carnap, an internal question is

a question that is asked within a particular linguistic framework.

Internal questions are answered by invoking the rules of the framework

together with logic and the empirical facts. Not all such questions

are trivial, but questions about the existence of the sorts of

entities definitive of the framework are. Carnap in fact thought that

the traditional metaphysician aimed to ask a framework independent

question, an external question, failing to realize that external

questions are best seen as non-cognitive practical questions about

which framework to adopt and at worst meaningless. (See the link to

Weisberg 2000, in the Other Internet Resources section).

Relying on Carnap’s distinction, within certain linguistic

frameworks, such as that presupposed by the Metaphysics 101 argument,

it is almost trivial that there are propositions. All it takes is

something as superficial as the Metaphysics 101 argument, or the

following even less enlightening argument, “The proposition that

snow is white is true; therefore, some proposition is true; therefore,

there are propositions.” The traditional metaphysician, however,

aims to ask a non-trivial question about the reality of the

propositions outside such frameworks. Such questions have no cognitive

content.

One of the chief difficulties for Carnap is to explain the truth of

internal statements. If ‘there are propositions’ is true,

even within a framework, what does its truth consist in? If truth in a

framework is explained in terms of truth given the axioms of the

framework, we will want to know about the truth-value of the

axioms themselves. If they are true, what makes them true? If they are

not true, why can’t we conclude that there really are no

propositions?

Even if we must reject Carnap’s internal/external distinction,

perhaps some form of “Neo-Carnapian” ambiguity hypothesis

can help explain away the appeal of the Metaphysics 101 argument.

A number of questions arise for the Neo-Carnapian. First, how are the

internal and external readings to be distinguished? Second, how

pervasive is the ambiguity? are there different readings not only for

quantified sentences but for attitude- and truth-ascriptions as well?

Third, what is the status of the Metaphysics 101 argument, given the

two readings? The argument must be unsound when understood externally,

but must it be invalid, or is it a valid argument with a false

premise? If so, which is false? Fourth, how could philosophers

regularly miss the internal/external ambiguity?

We will briefly describe two Neo-Carnapian accounts.

6.2 Fictionalism

One possibility is to explain the internal/external distinction by

reference to fictions. Internal statements are statements made within

or relative to a fiction, and they are to be assessed as true or false

relative to the fiction.

However, any fictionalist interpretation of the internal/external

distinction would have to explain why the fiction of propositions,

like the fictions of properties and numbers, is not a mere game, but

can be used for describing reality. We will briefly discuss a kind of

fictionalism designed to do just this: figuralism. (For

discussion, see Yablo (2000, 2001), Yablo and Rayo (2001), Yablo and

Gallois (1998), and for a similar view, Balaguer 1998a and 1998b).

Relying on pioneering work by Kendall Walton (1990), Yablo argues that

pretense can serve serious practical and theoretical purposes. To use

Walton’s example, by pretending that Italy is a boot, I can

easily convey to you the location of the Italian town of Crotone. Here

I am, in effect, using a pretense to convey information about the real

world. Literally, Italy is not a boot, but my interest is not in

speaking the literal truth, but in conveying a rather complicated fact

to you as effectively as I can. Similarly, Yablo and Gallois claim,

one may pretend there are certain entities in order to better convey

certain facts (1998, 245–8). One might pretend there are

directions in order to facilitate communication of facts about which

lines stand in which geometric relations to which other ones. Perhaps

one could do the same with propositions?

However, Yablo (2001) emphasizes that the figuralist need not be

committed to any psychological thesis about making-believe.

We may not consciously pretend that there are propositions when we say

that what we believe is true, just as we may not consciously pretend

that there are such things as stomach butterflies when we say we have

butterflies in our stomach. Figuralism requires only that there is a

semantical distinction between literal content and figurative content,

and that by asserting sentences with certain false or at least highly

doubtful literal contents, we may also express genuine facts, which

would be well nigh impossible to express literally. (See Balaguer

1998a and 1998b on the concept of representational aids)

Figuralism makes it possible to diagnose the failure of the

Metaphysics 101 argument as follows. If its steps are interpreted

literally, the argument is unsound but valid. If its steps are

interpreted figuratively, it is sound. Why are we fooled, then? One

promising suggestion is that it can be very difficult to distinguish

figurative from literal content, particularly when the figures

employed have little presentational force.

If we accept this diagnosis, we are committed to thinking that every

belief-ascription is literally false. This is a bitter pill to

swallow, though it may seem less bitter the less importance is placed

on literalness in communication (See Yablo 2001, p. 85).

6.3 Two Readings for Quantifiers

Some philosophers have suggested that ordinary English quantifiers are

susceptible to multiple readings, or different readings in different

contexts of use. Thus, Hilary Putnam (1987, 2004) has argued that

there is no single meaning associated with the vocabulary of

quantification, and that, depending on context, an assertion of

‘there are \(F\)s’ might be true or false. For example,

the Polish mereologist, in certain contexts, might be able to speak

truly in asserting ‘any objects compose a further object’,

whereas an assertion of the negation of this sentence might true in

different contexts. (Note that Putnam is clear that the phenomenon he

is describing isn’t mere quantifier-restriction.)

The acknowledgement of different meanings for the quantifiers is not

enough by itself to explain away the intuitiveness of the Metaphysics

101 argument. As we mentioned earlier, what is needed is an account of

the apparent oscillation between a shallow and a deep interpretation.

There could, in principle, be a plurality of interpretations of the

quantifiers even if none of the readings differed with respect to

metaphysical depth.

Recently, Thomas Hofweber (2005, 2016) has claimed to have found the

required pair of readings. A quantifier, he claims, may have either a

domain-conditions or inferential role reading. The

domain-conditions reading is just the familiar reading we know from

first order semantics: ‘there are \(F\)s’ is true iff

there exists an entity in the relevant real domain which satisfies

‘\(F\)’. This reading is therefore ontologically

committing and so deep (and thus external). The inferential

reading, by contrast, brings with it no ontological commitment, and so

is shallow (and thus internal).

Hofweber explains that the inferential role reading serves an

important function. It enables us the easy expression of partial

information. For example, I might not recall a name or unique

description of Fred’s favorite detective, but if I want express

the partial information I have, I can do this by saying “Fred

admires some detective.”. Now, on the domain-conditions reading,

what I express is false, and so I have misinformed my audience. What

we need, to achieve the desired end, is a reading for ‘there is

an \(F\)’ which validates existential generalization, regardless

of whether the names occurring in the premise refer to an entity. This

is what the inferential role reading provides. Thus, we say

“Fred admires some detective—yes, it’s Sherlock

Holmes!”

Hofweber points out that these two readings are not like the two

readings for ‘bank’. They validate many of the same

inferences (e.g., ‘there is an \(F \amp G\), therefore, there is

an \(F\) and there is a \(G\)’) and, within discourses lacking

empty singular terms, they validate all of the same inferences.

Now for the relevance to the Metaphysics 101 argument. On either

reading of the relevant quantifiers in the Metaphysics 101 argument

(those in steps 1, 2, and 4), the argument is valid. But on the

domain-conditions reading, premise 1 (at least) is, if not false, then

at least dubious—a piece of controversial ontology. On the

inferential-role reading, all the problems go away, and the argument

appears completely shallow. The Janus-faced character of the argument

comes from oscillating between the two readings. Moreover, given the

close relations between the two readings, it is understandable that

the metaphysician fails to realize her mistake in thinking that the

argument establishes the existence of propositions.

For an account like Hofweber’s to succeed, it must be possible

for attitude- and truth-ascriptions to be true even if

that-clauses do not designate. For if they designate, then

the domain-conditions reading of ‘there is something \(S\)

believes’ would be true.

7. The Nature and Status of Propositions

7.1 Easy Arguments: Mind-Independence and Abstractness

Reflection on the proposition role leads many propositionalists to

rather dramatic answers to questions about the nature and status of

propositions. Below is one standard line of argument, versions of

which can be found in Bealer (1998) and Schiffer (2003). (See also

Cartwright (1962) and Soames (1999).)

The proposition that there are rocks, which we denote \(\ltb\)there

are rocks\(\gtb\), does not entail the existence of any beings that

have or are capable of having mental states. It entails this neither

in a strictly or broadly logical sense. That is, it is

possible in the broadest sense for \(\ltb\)there are

rocks\(\gtb\) to be true in the absence of all mental states. But now,

if this proposition is possibly true in the absence of mental states,

then it possibly exists in the absence of all mental states, and so is

mind-independent. This is an easy argument for the mind-independence

of at least some propositions.

A parallel “easy argument” can be given for the

abstractness of at least some propositions. \(\ltb 2+2=4\gtb\) does

not entail the existence of concrete entities. So it is possible for

it to be true (and so to exist) in the absence of concrete entities.

Thus, it is possibly abstract. Assuming, contra Linksy and Zalta

(1996), that abstractness is, necessarily, an essential feature of

abstract entities, then it follows that \(\ltb 2+2=4\gtb\) is in fact

abstract. One might want to extend such arguments to contingent

propositions. Consider \(\ltb\)there are trees\(\gtb\). This

proposition is false in a world without concrete entities. But if it

is false in such a world, it must exist in that world, and so is

possibly, and so actually abstract.

Similar arguments can be constructed for properties. If properties are

what we assert of objects and what is true/false of

objects, then there are simple arguments for the conclusion that at

many properties are mind-independent and abstract.

It is dangerous to generalize these sorts of “Easy

Arguments” to all propositions (particularly singular

propositions). But even if they cannot be fully generalized, they

threaten to show that propositions would be mind-independent abstract

entities. Now, given that propositions de jure are sharable

objects of attitudes, it is antecedently unlikely that they should

turn out to be, say, token utterances. But one might have thought that

propositions could be identified with natural language sentence types

(as in Quine 1960), or with sentence types in the language of thought.

But if the Easy Arguments succeed, it seems that to accept

propositions, we must accept Platonism. Conceptualism about

propositions seems ruled out.

Many philosophers deny that there are propositions precisely because

they accept the validity of these Easy Arguments (and the truth of

certain attitude ascriptions). There are familiar problems besetting

the believer in abstract entities. The two “Benacerraf

problems,” in particular have received much attention in the

literature: the epistemological problem and identification problem.

The epistemological problem for abstract propositions, roughly, is

this: how can we know about abstract propositions, given that we

cannot causally interact with them? The identification problem

requires a bit more explanation. If propositions are abstract, then

there will be many distinct candidates for propositions which seem to

play the proposition role equally well. If certain entities, the

\(F\)s, are candidates for being propositions, why won’t the

entities consisting of an \(F\) paired with the number 1 count as

adequate candidates as well, so long as we reconstrue predicates for

propositions in such a way as to make the number 1 irrelevant? But

propositions cannot be both \(F\)s and these new entities, because

these new entities are not \(F\)s. Is it simply indeterminate what

propositions are? See the entry on

platonism in metaphysics.

(See also J. Moore 1999.)

The Easy Arguments can appear suspicious. How can the seemingly

obvious acknowledgement that there are propositions—i.e., that

beliefs have sharable objects which bear truth-values—commit us

to there being mind-independent abstract entities? We will discuss two

sorts of reply found in the literature. Both are objections to the

inference from there being propositions to the claim that

propositions have the surprising features. We are putting aside

objections to the claim that there are propositions.

7.2 Reply #1: Truth in a World vs. Truth at a World.

The Easy Arguments rely on an assumption about entailment and truth,

namely:

(Assumption A)

If a proposition \(\ltb p\gtb\) fails to entail a proposition

\(\ltb q\gtb\), then it is possible for \(\ltb

p\gtb\) to be true while not-\(q\).

This assumption is needed to reason from premises about propositions

failing to entail other propositions about there being mental states

or being concrete entities to the possible truth of those propositions

in the absence of mental states and concrete entities.

But how could (A) fail? If a proposition fails to entail that \(q\),

doesn’t it follow that there is a possible world in which the

former is true and not-\(q\)?

Some philosophers (Pollock 1985, King 2007) have argued that

principles like (A) have two readings, one clearly acceptable but

useless to the Easy Arguments and the other useful to those arguments

but false. The two readings correspond to two ways of understanding

talk of truth with respect to possible worlds. One way for something

to be true with respect to a world requires the truth-bearer to exist

in the world and be true there. Another way is for the truth-bearer to

“correctly describe” the world, where this does not

require existing in the world. Pollock gives the example of a picture

depicting the non-existence of all pictures. The picture could

correctly depict a situation even though the situation it depicts is

one in which the picture itself does not exist. Similarly, the

Medieval philosopher Jean Buridan discusses the example of an

utterance of ‘there are no negative utterances’. This

utterance correctly describes a certain possible situation even though

that situation is one in which the utterance would not exist.

Following Adams (1981), we may call the former way of being true with

respect to a world truth in a world and the latter truth

at a world. The conceptualist may claim that propositions can be

true at worlds without being true in them, by analogy with the

examples from Pollock and Buridan. A proposition like \(\ltb\)there

are no propositions\(\gtb\) is true at certain possible worlds but

true in none. Since we do not want to say that such propositions are

necessary, we must understand necessity as truth at every

possible world. Correspondingly, to preserve the connections between

entailment and necessity, we must understand entailment in terms of

the entailed proposition being true at every world at which the

entailing proposition is true. Given all this, we can distinguish two

readings for Assumption A:

(Reading 1)

If a proposition \(\ltb p\gtb\) fails to entail a proposition

\(\ltb q\gtb\), then there is a possible world \(W\) such that \(\ltb

p\gtb\) is true in \(W\) and not-\(q\) at \(W\).

(Reading 2)

If a proposition \(\ltb p\gtb\) fails to entail a proposition

\(\ltb q\gtb\), then there is a possible world \(W\) such that \(\ltb

p\gtb\) is true at \(W\) and not-\(q\) at \(W\).

Given the understanding of entailment in terms of truth at a world,

the conceptualist will claim that Reading 1 is false, while Reading 2

is true but useless to the Easy Arguments. Thus, the conclusions of

those arguments are blocked.

The plausibility of this response depends on having a good account of

what truth at a world amounts to. But this, in turn, depends on issues

in the metaphysics of modality.

If worlds are concrete particulars (“I and all my

surroundings”), as they are for David Lewis (1986), then we

could say that a proposition is true at a world if the

proposition is about the entities that are parts of that world and is

true, and true in a world if true at a world and also part of

that world. There may well be difficulties of explaining how a

proposition could be part of more than one concrete world (and why it

would only be part of some concrete worlds but not all), but this

framework seems to make conceptual room for the possibility

propositions being true at worlds without being true in them.

Suppose, however, that worlds were conceived as world stories, i.e.,

as maximal consistent sets of propositions (see Section 2). How, then,

might truth at a world be understood? One approach, favored by Adams

(1981), is to explain truth at a world in terms of truth in a world,

understanding the latter to amount to truth were the world actual

(were all its members true). On this approach, we would understand

what is true at a world in terms of what is true in it, together with

certain facts about the actual world. However, the conceptualist

cannot abide this approach. For, on this approach, the members of any

world are true in that world. But since the members of any and every

world are propositions, it would follow that, contrary to

conceptualism, that it is necessary that there are propositions. A

more conceptualist-friendly approach is to reverse the order of

explanation, to explain truth in a world in terms of truth at a world

+ existence in that world. How could truth at a world be understood? A

natural proposal is to understand it as membership in a world

story.

Difficulties emerge with this proposal when we face the question of

how to understand consistency of world stories. There are maximal sets

of propositions that are not possible worlds because they are not

consistent in the relevant sense. But the relevant sense is

not easily defined. Following Adams (1981), we might wish to use the

concept of possibility to gloss the notion of consistency: a set of

propositions is consistent if and only if those propositions could all

be true together. This returns us to the problem noted in the previous

paragraph: it again would turn out that necessarily there are

propositions (even in mindless worlds).

The conceptualist might hope to take the relevant notion of

consistency as primitive and reject the gloss in terms of joint

possible truth. Still, we should ask about the broader implications of

denying the joint possible truth of consistent world stories.

Consider, for instance the notion of actuality. Only one of the many

possible worlds is actual, although each is actual relative to itself.

The actual one, on the world story view, is the one all of whose

members are true. But if this is what actuality for worlds amounts to,

then assuming possible worlds are possibly actual, it would follow

that for each possible world all its members could be true together.

Ought we to deny that possible worlds are possibly actual?

The conceptualist might hope to avoid these problems, without falling

back on Lewis’s concrete realism about possible worlds, by

understanding worlds in terms of properties or states of affairs,

rather than propositions. Following Stalnaker (1976), one might think

of worlds as properties which are ways things could have been.

Following Plantinga (1974) and others, one might think of worlds as

maximal consistent states of affairs, where these are thought of as

distinct from propositions.

However, this retrenchment may end up only shifting the Platonist

worries elsewhere. To distinguish the ways that are possible

worlds (or possible world-states) from those which are not, it is

difficult to avoid appealing to a gloss in terms of being possibly

instantiated: the possible worlds are not only maximal but they could

be instantiated. Taking this line would require conceding that in

every world there are properties. Something similar holds for the

conception of possible worlds as maximal consistent states of

affairs.

One might think, however, that Platonism about properties is less

problematic than Platonism about propositions. The former do not

represent the world, whereas the latter, as truth-bearers, do (Jubien

2001, King 2007). However, properties can apply or fail to apply to

objects, and can be said to be true or false of objects, and so it is

not clear that worries about representation clearly gain more traction

for propositions than for properties. Similar considerations apply to

states of affairs.

Despite these worries, the conceptualist might be encouraged by the

example of singular propositions. Hasn’t the truth in vs. truth

at distinction been useful in dealing with the modality of singular

propositions? For example, consider any singular proposition about

Socrates, e.g., the proposition that Socrates was a philosopher. Such

propositions, plausibly, depend for their existence on the object they

are directly about. One might therefore think that no singular

proposition about Socrates could exist unless Socrates existed.

Consider, then, the proposition that Socrates does not exist. It is

clearly contingent that Socrates exists; things could have been

otherwise. But then the proposition that Socrates does not exist would

appear to be possible without being possibly true. Unlike the examples

from Pollock and Buridan, however, we cannot understand such

possibility without possible truth in terms of expressing a possibly

true proposition while not being possibly true itself. Propositions do

not express propositions, of course, and so we cannot understand their

possibility without possible truth in this way (Plantinga 1981). What

is it, then, for such a singular proposition to be possible but not

possibly true? Answering this question was one of the key motivations

in the development of the distinction between truth in and truth at a

world. But while Adams and others attempted to do this by thinking of

truth at a world as determined by what is true in that world together

with a certain set of facts about the actual world, the conceptualist

hopes to kick aside the ladder of truth in a world altogether. Whether

this hope is reasonable or not is an important issue in contemporary

work on propositions. (Key recent discussions include King 2007,

Soames 2010, and Merricks 2015).

7.3 Reply #2: Deflationism to the Rescue?

Another response to the Easy Arguments is, so to speak, to deflate

their significance by deflating propositions. The Easy Arguments

succeed, but their success marks no great philosophical discovery and

raises no hard questions of the sort that have traditionally bothered

metaphysicians of a nominalist bent.

We will here discuss only Stephen Schiffer’s (2003) theory of

“pleonastic

propositions.”[9]

Propositions exist, for Schiffer, but unlike rocks or cats, there is

nothing more to them than what our concept of a proposition

guarantees. One may call them “abstract entities,” if one

likes, but this label should not encourage the thought that our minds

can reach beyond the physical world to make contact with denizens of a

Platonic universe. We know about propositions, not by interacting with

them, as we do with rocks and cats, but by being participants in

certain sorts of linguistic or conceptual practice. It’s because

we speak or think in certain ways that we are able to know about

propositions.

Schiffer argues, in effect, that given our proposition-talk and

thought, propositions are, in D. M. Armstrong’s phrase, a kind

of “ontological free lunch.” That is, the key

“axioms” of our proposition-talk and thought are

guaranteed to be true. These include the instances of the equivalence

schema (E) for propositions: The proposition that \(p\) is true

iff \(p\). Given the truth of such axioms, it follows that

propositions exist and have the features attributed to them by our

axioms. Moreover, because these axioms are constitutive of the concept

of a proposition, it follows that, by possessing that concept, we can

know the truth of these axioms.

One might concede to Schiffer that the axioms are constitutive of our

concept of a proposition. But why think those axioms are true?

Schiffer stresses that we do not make the axioms true by saying,

thinking, or “stipulating” that they are true. The

mind-independence of propositions, after all, is implicit in those

axioms.

Schiffer’s argument for pleonastic propositions is of a piece

with his argument for pleonastic entities generally, including

fictional entities, events, and properties. A pleonastic entity, for

him, is an entity that falls under a pleonastic concept. The latter is

the key notion and is defined as follows.

Definition: A concept \(F\) is pleonastic iff it implies true

something-from-nothing transformations.

A SFN (something-from-nothing) transformation (about \(F\)s) is a

statement that allows us to deduce a statement about a kind of entity

F, from a statement that involves no reference to \(F\)s. (61) SFN

transformations assert a kind of supervenience condition on

\(F\)s: if the relevant non-\(F\) conditions obtain, \(F\)s exist and

have the relevant features. (E.g., if snow is white, then the

proposition that snow is white exists and is true.)

If the concept \(F\) is pleonastic, then there are \(F\)s. We need to

know how to tell if a concept is pleonastic. Here is Schiffer’s

test:

Test: A concept \(F\) is pleonastic (and so implies true

something-from-nothing transformations) iff adding it to any theory

yields a conservative extension of that theory. (57)

Schiffer’s final formulation of the conservativeness test

is:

For any theory \(T\) and sentence \(S\) expressible in \(T\), if the

theory obtained by adding to \(T_{/{\sim}F} \ltb\)the theory resulting

from restricting quantifiers in \(T\) to \({\sim}F\)s\(\gtb\) the

concept of an \(F\), together with its something-from-nothing

\(F\)-entailment claims, logically entails \(S_{{\sim}F}\ltb\)the

sentence resulting from restricting quantifiers in \(S\) to

\({\sim}F\)s\(\gtb\), then \(T_{/{\sim}F}\) logically entails

\(S_{{\sim}F}\). (p. 57)

One might think the conservativeness test is overly complicated, and

that all that matters is that the new entities not interfere with the

empirical world. If so, then the test would mention only empirical

theories not all theories. But, as Matti Eklund (2007) points out, two

kinds of entity that are individually non-interfering with respect to

the empirical world might interfere with one another. Schiffer is

aware of this problem (see his discussion of anti-fictional entities,

pp. 55–6), and this is why he turns to the more complicated

account.

Schiffer’s picture is this. If a concept satisfies the

conservativeness test, then its instantiation would be unproblematic

because it would interfere with nothing else. Its instantiation comes

for free. If a concept doesn’t meet this test, it doesn’t

come for free.

Although Schiffer’s view of propositions can be described as

deflationary in one sense (because it attempts to deflate questions

about the existence and nature of propositions), the meta-ontology

underlying Schiffer’s approach is, if anything, inflationary:

all “non-interfering” kinds of entity are

instantiated.

Schiffer’s, and other deflationist theories, must, at a minimum,

answer the following two questions, in addition to the questions

facing all propositionalists:

(1)

Why would the non-interference of \(F\)s be evidence for their

existence?

Even if \(F\)s would be non-interfering in Schiffer’s sense, the

postulation of \(F\)s logically conflicts with some consistent

theories, e.g., ‘There are no \(F\)s’. Schiffer places

severer constraints on the denial of entities than on the acceptance

of them. Suppose \(F\)s would be non-interfering. Then adding them

would not add information about non-\(F\)s. But suppose also that

denying \(F\)s would not add information about non-\(F\)s. Why

isn’t this a reason to deny \(F\)s? So, in this sense, the

theory denying \(F\)s passes a corresponding conservativeness

test.

(2)

How can the deflationist explain how these propositions have

truth-conditions?

If the proposition that snow is white is a simple, necessary and

eternal object, why does its having a property (truth) have anything

to do with concrete snow’s having a property (whiteness)? Do

instances of the T-schema simply state brute necessary connections

between abstract objects and concrete ones? Or do these necessary

connections somehow derive from our practices, and if so, how?

7.4 Reply #3: Propositions as Types

Another reaction one might have to the Easy Arguments is to accept

their conclusions but to give an account of the nature of propositions

which will make these conclusions palatable. One promising line of

thinking, in this regard, is to think of propositions as types, the

tokens of which are mental or linguistic acts or events, and in

particular the acts that would be thought to express the

proposition. Such views have been developed in recent years by Dummett

(1996), Hanks (2011, 2015), and Soames (2010, 2014a, 2015). We focus

here on the recent proposals put forth by Hanks and Soames.

The type view is motivated by its answers to otherwise puzzling

features of traditional Platonist views of propositions (e.g. Frege

(1984)). On this view, belief and other attitudes are understood as

relations to already-existing propositions which represent things as

being a certain way. The truth or falsity of an individual’s

belief or other cognitive state is explained by the truth or falsity

of the proposition which is the object of that state. If truth

consists in a representation’s being accurate, then a

proposition is true just in case it accurately represents things as

being a certain way. Thus, on the traditional view, thinking subjects

represent things as being a certain way (either in thought or

language) by standing in appropriate relations to propositions which

fundamentally represent things as being a certain way.

Two problems arise for the Platonist’s position. First, how do

cognizers come to be acquainted with such propositions? Second, what

explains how propositions represent things as being a certain way?

Platonists appear to have no answer to the epistemic question, and

presumably accept representation as a primitive feature of

propositions. Type theorists, however, explain the relation between a

cognizer and a proposition simply as an instance of the general

relation between type and token. Consider, as Dummett (1996, p. 259)

does, one’s humming of a tune. The tune is a species or type of

musical performance capable of having multiple performances at

differing times or locations, while the humming of it is a token act

belonging to that type. One might then see the relation of a

proposition to a mental or linguistic act as one between the type of

act performed and the performance of the act.

What type of acts should one identify with propositions? For both

Hanks and Soames, propositions are types of predicative acts.

The notion of predication here is simply, for atomic propositions, one

of an agent’s representing an object \(o\) as having property

\(F\). (Hanks (2015, p. 64) characterizes predication as

categorization, or the sorting of things into groups

according to a rule. We will take this to be a form of

representation.) Since representation is primarily something done by

cognitive agents, according to Hanks and Soames, one might wonder

whether the proposition itself is representational, and so possesses

truth-conditions, on the type view. Both theorists respond to this

concern by claiming that propositions are representational in a

secondary, derivative sense. There are many examples of types that

inherit features of their tokens (a sonata (type) can be discordant in

virtue of performances of it being discordant; a movie can be

frightening in virtue of its tokens being so, etc. See the entry on

types and tokens.)

Just as an act can be described as intelligent in order to

communicate that the agent acted intelligently in performing

the act, type theorists will claim that a proposition represents \(o\)

as \(F\) in a similarly derivative sense wherein any agent who

performs the act of predicating \(F\) of \(o\) will thereby represent

\(o\) as \(F\). One question that arises for such a view is whether

propositions are genuinely representational entities with

truth-conditions, or whether the claim that a proposition represents

things as being a certain way is simply a convenient manner of

speaking indirectly about the actual and possible representational

acts of thinkers.

As we have seen, the type view reverses the traditional order of

explanation concerning the nature of predication, representation, and

truth-conditions. On the traditional, Fregean picture, propositions

exist as objective, mind-independent entities “waiting” to

be entertained, judged or asserted, so to speak. On this view, for a

subject S to predicate \(F\) of \(o\) is for S to entertain the

proposition that \(o\) is \(F\); for S to represent \(o\) as \(F\) in

thought or language is to have have a thought or utterance with the

primarily representational proposition that o is F as its

content, etc. On the type view, a proposition’s representational

and predicative properties are derived from the fundamentally

representational and predicative acts of agents.

A concern for the type view is whether there will be “missing

propositions”—truths or falsehoods which have never been

entertained. One drawn to the type view may allow for the existence of

uninstantiated types to account for the existence of these

propositions. However, given that propositions are claimed to derive

their representational features from their tokens, such uninstantiated

types would lack representational features, and so lack

truth-conditions. Hanks suggests dealing with such propositions

counterfactually. Even if no one had ever predicated eloquence of

Clinton, the proposition that Clinton is eloquent is true iff Clinton

is eloquent because if someone were to predicate eloquence of

Clinton, the token would be true iff Clinton is eloquent. Predicative

types, then, inherit their representation features from both their

actual and possible tokens. This response, however, leaves us with the

question of truths for which there are not even any merely possible

tokens—for example, mathematical truths that are too complicated

for any finite mind to grasp. What, if anything, provides the

truth-conditions of these propositions?

Hanks (2015, p. 27) allows that propositions are mind-independent and

objective entities which do not depend for their existence on having

any tokens, just as one might think about a difficult type of dive

that has never been performed. Thus, while Hanks’ view appears

to be a rejection of a traditional Platonism about propositions, it

seems nevertheless to accept a Platonism about types by untethering

their existence from their tokens. (Compare to Dodd’s (2007)

defense of Platonism about types.) Soames (2014a,b) also allows for

untokened types, but only those whose constituents have been referred

to or predicated in other propositions. For Soames, a proposition

\(p\) may exist in \(w\) even if no token of \(p\) has been performed

in \(w\). For Soames, if in \(w\) a predicative event has occurred in

which an agent predicates \(n\)-place property \(R\) of \(n\) objects,

and in \(w\) events of referring to or thinking of objects \(o_1,

\ldots, o_n\) have occurred, then the proposition that is the type of

act of predicating \(R\) of \(o_1, \ldots, o_n\) exists (even if \(R\)

has never been predicated of \(o_1, \ldots, o_n\) in \(w)\). Still, it

would seem that there can be truths in a world about objects that have

never been thought of or referred to in that world. In response to

this, Soames claims that a proposition need not exist in a world \(w\)

in order to be true in \(w\). In support of this, Soames appeals to

other, albeit controversial, cases in which an object can have a

property despite not existing. For instance, Socrates can have the

properties of being referred to or being admired

despite no longer existing. Thus, Soames’ accommodation of our

intuitions concerning propositions that have never been thought

appears to involve a rejection of Actualism.

The type view has been argued to provide solutions to several

traditional problems for propositional thought, including

Frege’s puzzle, first-person belief, Kripke’s puzzle about

belief, and the problem of empty names. In responding to these

problems, Soames invokes “Millian modes of presentation,”

or ways of cognizing an object in thought which do not affect the

representational content of the act, to preserve a non-Fregean,

Millian view of semantic content for names and natural kind terms

while individuating propositions finely enough to solve traditional

problems in the philosophy of language. Hanks, by contrast, invokes

distinct types of referential and expressive acts as the constituents

of propositions. On this view, each use of a name falls under several

different reference types which differ in their fineness of grain,

each associated with a different proposition.

As we have seen, the type view is motivated in large part by the

perceived need to explain how propositions represent things as being a

certain way on the grounds that a view which accepts primitively

representational propositions is objectionably mysterious. Some

question, however, whether the representational properties of

propositions can (or need to) be explained at all (McGlone 2012,

Caplan, et al. 2013, Merricks 2015). Merricks, for example, argues

that we should accept that there are fundamentally representational

entities, but that we have no reason to favor mental states (such as

beliefs) over propositions as being the fundamental bearers of

representational properties. For if, e.g., beliefs are fundamentally

representational, then it is either a primitive fact about them that

they represent what they do, or it is a feature capable of

explanation. If it is a primitive fact about them, then the view

appears just as mysterious as one which accepts that propositions are

primitively representational. If it is a fact capable of explanation,

as the type theorists contend, then it is presumably explained in

terms of an agent’s ability to predicate properties of objects.

But unless there is some explanation of how an agent can engage in

predication, predication must itself be a primitive representational

ability, and the theory has not made any genuine progress on what was

to be explained.

A final question worth considering at this stage is whether

propositions are representational entities at all. Richard (2013) and

Speaks (2014), for instance, each develop views of propositions which

deny that they are. Consider the view defended by Richard. Sentences,

beliefs, and the like represent things as being a certain

way—snow as being white, for example. Put another way, the

sentence ‘Snow is white’ represents snow’s being

white, where this is simply a way for things to be—a state of

affairs or property that is either instantiated or not (but does not

represent things as being any way, just as properties are not in

general representational). On this approach, the proposition expressed

by the sentence is identified with the way that things are represented

as being, not as something which has representational properties

either primitively or in need of explanation by more fundamental acts

of predication. If an approach along these lines is correct, the type

view appears to lose one of its central motivations.

8. The Individuation of Propositions

Some philosophers, notably W.V.O. Quine, recognize the existence of

certain sorts of abstract entities but not others at least partly on

the basis of concerns about identity conditions. Quine granted the

existence of sets, in part because they obey the extensionality axiom:

sets are identical iff they have the same members. When it came to

properties, relations and propositions, however, he found no such

clear criterion of identity. The property of being a creature with a

heart, he noted, is distinct from the property of being a creature

with a kidney, even if all the same things exemplify the two

properties.

It is a controversial matter whether Quine was right to demand such

rigorous criteria of identity as a condition for acceptance of a class

of entities. However, even if Quine asks too much, any good theory of

propositions ought to have something to say about when propositions

are identical and when they are distinct. Developing theories which

give such accounts in a way that fits well with intuitive data

concerning propositional attitude ascriptions would enhance our

reasons to accept propositions.

The question of identity conditions for propositions is importantly

related to the question of whether propositions are structured

entities. Propositions are structured if they have

constituents, in some broad sense, and the order of the

constituents matters. Order matters only if there could be two

structured propositions sharing all the same constituents, but which

are distinct due to differences in the way under which those

constituents are “united” in the proposition. E.g., if the

proposition that \(a\) loves \(b\) is the ordered triple

\(\ltb\)loving, \(a, b\gtb\), it is distinct from the

proposition that \(b\) loves \(a\), which would be the ordered triple

\(\ltb\)loving, \(b, a\gtb\).

If propositions are structured entities, then sameness of constituents

and sameness of order will entail identity. There are, of course,

dangers, in regarding propositions as structured. Prima facie, one

would rather not claim that the proposition that \(x\) is triangular

is identical to the proposition that \(x\) is trilateral, since a

subject might believe one but not the other. It will be important,

then, not to individuate propositions too coarsely. However, one might

worry, in the opposing direction, about overly fine individuations of

propositions. Is the proposition that John loves Mary different from

the proposition that Mary is loved by John? For more on structured

propositions, see the entry on

structured propositions.[10]

Any theory that construes propositions as structured entities would

seem to face the problem of the unity of the proposition. It

is not entirely straightforward to say what this problem or set of

problems is. But at the very least, there are at least two problems

here. There is the problem of explaining why one sort of structured

whole, a proposition, can be true or false, while the set of its

constituents is not. A list isn’t true or false, and a

proposition with the same constituents is; why is this? Second, there

is a general problem of explaining how two distinct things could have

all the same constituents. For a thorough discussion of the history of

philosophical work on the unity of the sentence and the proposition,

the reader should consult Gaskin (2008).

Some hold that propositions lack constituents altogether, and so are

unstructured. If propositions are unstructured, then if they are sets,

they inherit the identity conditions for sets: sameness of members.

Thus, if a proposition is the set of worlds in which it is true (as in

Stalnaker 1976), then \(P=Q\) iff \(P\) and \(Q\) have the same worlds

as members iff \(P\) and \(Q\) are true in the same worlds. As is

well-known, this theory leads to a very coarse individuation of

propositions, too coarse, arguably, to handle propositional attitudes.

(See Soames (1987) for a discussion of this theory as well as the

theory of propositions as sets of concrete situations or facts.

If propositions are unstructured and distinct from sets, there are

several possibilities for explaining their identity conditions. First,

identity conditions might be specified in terms of possible attitudes.

One possibility is this: \(P=Q\) if, necessarily whoever believes

(asserts, denies, etc.) \(P\) believes (asserts, denies, etc.) \(Q\),

and vice versa. Second, proposition identity might be reduced to

property identity in the manner of Myhill (1963) and Zalta (1983).

Thus, Zalta (1983, 72) offers the following definition of proposition

identity: \(\ltb p\gtb =\ltb q\gtb\) if and only if the property of

being such that \(p\) is identical to the property of being such that

\(q\). A third proposal, not incompatible with the second, is to

explain proposition identity in terms of the “free

generation” of propositions from a stock of certain

non-propositional entities, e.g., individuals, properties and

relations, by algebraic operations (Bealer 1982, Menzel 1986, Zalta

1983 and

1989).[11]

Although propositions on this approach are unstructured, each

proposition may be represented by its “construction

sequence.” To avoid identifying \(\ltb\)Hesperus is

beautiful\(\gtb\) with \(\ltb\)Phosphorus is beautiful\(\gtb\), the

relevant inputs cannot simply be Hesperus (Phosphorus) and the

property of being beautiful. A well-known strategy to cope with this

problem, due to Frege, is to appeal to different modes of presentation

associated with the different names, each contributing something

different to the proposition expressed. However, these modes need not

be understood as complex properties uniquely exemplified by referent

of the name. For instance, Bealer (1998) invokes what he calls

“non-Platonic” modes of presentation. Whether these

non-Platonic modes of presentation are understood as words, as causal

chains of word use, or in some other way, the important point is that

the mode associated with ‘Hesperus’ will be different than

that associated with ‘Phosphorus’. Zalta (1989) introduces

propositions with abstract constituents to do the work of these modes.

On Zalta’s view, such singular propositions are built out of

abstract individuals that encode the cognitive content of names. Since

these abstract individuals encode this cognitive content, there is no

need for the referent of the name to instantiate it, and a fortiori no

need for the content to be a property uniquely instantiated by this

referent. For more on encoding vs. instantiating, see section 6 of the

entry on

existence.

Thus, these theorists hope to use the metaphysical tools of these

algebraic accounts to accommodate some of the key Fregean intuitions

about differences in propositions expressed while avoiding

difficulties with the Fregean doctrine of sense.

For a recent criticism of the notion of propositional constituency,

see Keller (2013); for a positive account of propositional

constituency, see Gilmore (2014).

9. Propositions, Facts, and States of Affairs

Frege famously wrote, “‘Facts, facts, facts’ cries

the scientist if he wants to bring home the necessity of a firm

foundation for science. What is a fact? A fact is a thought that is

true.” (1918, p. 25)

Is a fact just a true proposition? There are metaphysical and

linguistic arguments to the contrary. Here is a standard metaphysical

argument. The fact that snow is white couldn’t exist if snow

wasn’t white, but the true proposition would (only it would be

false). Therefore, the fact isn’t the true proposition (See

Moore 1953, p. 308). Facts might be, still, in some sense,

derivative from true propositions, even if the identity claim fails.

Following Moore (1953, pp. 261–2) and Slote (1974, p. 99), Kit

Fine (1982, pp. 52–3) suggests that facts may be conceived as

concretizations of true propositions. Thus, the fact that \(p\) is the

truth of \(\ltb p\gtb\). However, so construing facts makes them poor

candidates for truthmakers: the truth of \(p\), presumably, is not

what makes \(\ltb p\gtb\) true.

One well-known linguistic argument against identifying facts with true

propositions is closely related to the Ambiguity Response to The

Substitution Problem, considered in Section 5.4. Substitution of

‘the fact that \(p\)’ for ‘the true proposition that

\(p\)’, or vice versa, produces peculiarities such as

“John believes the fact that Obama is president”, or

Harman’s (2003) “The true proposition that fires are hot

makes it the case that fires are hot.” If facts were true

propositions, so it is argued, one would expect the substitutions to

preserve truth.

Nonetheless, there are other uses of ‘fact’ that support

the identification:

Snow is white. That’s a fact. But it wouldn’t have been a

fact if snow were not white. So, some things that are facts might not

have been facts.

Used in this way, ‘fact’ seems to apply to entities that

resemble propositions, in that they have two modes of being: existence

and something akin to truth (e.g., obtaining) (see McGrath

2003).[12]

One option, in the face of apparently conflicting uses of

‘fact’, is to posit an ambiguity. (Fine 1982, p. 54) There

are two kinds of entity associated with different uses of

‘fact’: one kind has one mode of being (it simply exists),

the other has having two modes of being (it may exist without

obtaining). “Bipolar” facts correspond, roughly, to what

some philosophers call possible states of affairs.

However, some philosophers would want to distinguish even such bipolar

facts from propositions. Bipolar facts, the argument goes, are states

of affairs, rather than true propositions. Clearly, not all

propositions can be possible states of affairs, because there are

propositions that are not possibly true, whereas possible states of

affairs must obtain in at least some possible world. We might wish to

extend the notion of a state of affairs to include impossible ones.

Whether states of affairs, understood in this extended sense, are

propositions clearly depends on the answers to questions about their

identity conditions. See the entry on

states of affairs,

as well as Richard (2013) for a recent view identifying propositions

with states of affairs.

King (1995, 2007, 2014) argues that all propositions are facts,

although not the ones that we might expect. The proposition that Mary

loves John is not the fact that Mary loves John but rather (to a first

approximation) the following fact: Mary, loving, and John being the

semantic values of linguistic items standing in a certain syntactic

relation (represented by a phrase marker tree) which encodes

instantiation. King argues that his account has many virtues. It helps

solve the problem of the unity of the proposition (see the previous

section), insofar as the structure of a proposition derives from the

syntactic structure of a corresponding sentence. It requires

relatively minimal ontological commitments: if one accepts that there

are languages with expressions designating objects and properties and

in which certain syntactic relations encode instantiation, then one

will accept King-propositions. The account also provides for finely

individuated propositions: differences in syntactic structure of

sentences will carry over to differences in the propositions

expressed. Given that the existence of King-propositions seems to

depend on their being language-users who use language in certain ways,

King is a conceptualist about propositions. (See section 7.2

above).

10. Sparse and Abundant Conceptions of Propositions

In discussing the question of whether there are properties, D. M.

Armstrong (1989) distinguishes sparse from abundant conceptions of

properties. Following standard terminology, let us say that when a

predicate has a property as its semantic content, the predicate

expresses that property. (For simplicity, we will assume that

sentences can have propositions as semantic contents.) Under an

abundant conception of properties, whether a predicate expresses a

property depends only on its broadly syntactic facts about it. The

simplest abundant conception holds that every well-formed predicate

expresses a property. According to sparse conceptions, not every

syntactically well-formed predicate expresses a property.

A similar distinction may be applied to conceptions of propositions.

Abundant conceptions will impose only broadly syntactic restrictions

on the expression of propositions. Sparse conceptions will deny that

having the relevant syntactic properties is sufficient for the

expression and designation of propositions. Abundant conceptions of

propositions face the threat of paradox. For more, see the discussion

on

the Russell-Myhill Paradox

in the entry on Alonzo Church.

10.1 Expressivism and Moral Propositions

One motivation for accepting a sparse conception of propositions is

expressivism in metaethics. “Old-fashioned” expressivists

(e.g., Ayer and Stevenson) claimed that moral sentences are

non-cognitive. We cannot believe that lying in politics is wrong, nor

can we have any broadly cognitive attitudes (e.g., disbelief) of the

form ‘\(A\)-ing that \(p\)’ where ‘\(p\)’

contains moral terms. If we cannot have such attitudes, then

presumably there are no moral propositions. (If there were such

propositions, why wouldn’t there be possible cognitive attitudes

having them as contents?). And if there are no moral propositions,

then moral sentences do not express propositions, and so lack

truth-value.

We certainly talk and think as if we have moral beliefs, as if we

believe moral propositions. For the old-fashioned expressivist, then,

many of our apparently sincere ordinary claims will have to be

rejected. Endorsing such a sparse conception of propositions thus

leads to the surprising consequence all moral sentences lack

truth-value.

Some contemporary expressivists (Blackburn 1998, Horwich 1993, Stoljar

1993) are less averse to moral propositions, moral properties and

moral facts. But they take these commitments as

shallow.[13]

They accept an abundant conception of propositions, properties, etc.,

but combine it with a generous dose of deflationism. There are moral

propositions, but they are mere shadows of moral declarative

sentences. (Even if they are shadows of our sentences in some sense,

they are not shadows in another sense, at least if the Easy Arguments

for mind-independence and abstractness are successful: what is

mind-independent and abstract is, in a clear sense, not merely a

shadow of sentences.)

At least three important questions can be asked about the combination

of expressivism and deflationism about moral propositions. First, if

the expressivist accepts moral propositions, what is the difference

between expressivism and realism? Second, by accepting deflationary

moral propositions, can the expressivist avoid the familiar problems

for moral realism (and cognitivism) which helped motivate expressivism

in the first place? Third, can the realist avoid these familiar

problems equally well by accepting deflationary moral

propositions?

The first question is examined in the entry on

moral cognitivism vs non-cognitivism.

We will briefly discuss the other two.

Consider, for example, the Humean argument facing realism, a crude

version of which is as follows. If there are moral propositions, then

moral judgments are beliefs in moral propositions. But moral judgments

are intrinsically motivational states, whereas beliefs are not. So,

there are no moral propositions. Of course, this argument may be

criticized as relying on an overly strong internalism, or a

simple-minded speculative psychology. But even when improved, it is

not immediately clear how accepting deflationism about moral

propositions will help the expressivist solve the problem. The moral

propositions exist, and so why can’t they be believed

independently of having any intrinsically motivating states? How can

their deflationary character help defuse this question? Moreover,

suppose that deflationism did help the expressivist cope with this

problem. Why couldn’t the realist follow suit with her own

appeal to deflationism?

Blackburn’s supervenience argument is a second argument against

realism. Blackburn formulated the argument in terms of moral

properties, as follows. If there are moral properties, then they

supervene on non-moral properties as a matter of conceptual necessity.

That is, in every conceptually possible world, if two things share all

non-moral properties, they share all moral properties. But if there

are moral properties, the pattern of supervenience is not itself

conceptually necessary. So, even if all \(P\)s are \(M\)s in fact,

there is some conceptually possible world in which there is a \(P\)

which isn’t an \(M\). Blackburn’s question is this: if

moral properties can come apart from non-moral properties

across worlds, why can’t they come apart from them

within worlds? That is: what explains the “ban on mixed

worlds”? A similar problem can be formulated for truth as a

feature of moral propositions. What explains the ban on conceptually

possible worlds in which one moral proposition \(\ltb x\) is \(M\gtb\)

is true, while another moral proposition \(\ltb y\) is \(M\gtb\) is

false, but in which all relevant non-moral propositions \(\ltb x\) is

\(P\gtb\) and \(\ltb y\) is \(P\gtb\) are alike in truth-value? What

is not immediately clear is, first, how deflationary moral

propositions will prove useful to the expressivist in answering this

question, and second, how, supposing they do prove useful, why they

won’t prove equally useful to the realist.

What the expressivist seeks is a conception of propositions (and of

truths, facts, and beliefs) substantive enough to explain and validate

our ordinary realist-seeming discourse but deflationary enough to

avoid the traditional problems for realism. Whether it is possible to

navigate the two is the subject of intense scrutiny in contemporary

metaethics.

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–––, 1918, “Lectures on Logical

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Proposition Definition & Meaning | Britannica Dictionary

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proposition

2 ENTRIES FOUND:

proposition (noun)

proposition (verb)

1

proposition

/ˌprɑːpəˈzɪʃən/

noun

plural

propositions

1

proposition

/ˌprɑːpəˈzɪʃən/

noun

plural

propositions

Britannica Dictionary definition of PROPOSITION

[count]

:

something (such as a plan or offer) that is presented to a person or group of people to consider

He made an attractive business proposition.

The other company rejected their proposition.

[+] more examples

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[+] Example sentences

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:

a statement to be proved, explained, or discussed

Her theory rejects the basic proposition that humans evolved from apes.

If we accept proposition “A” as true, then we must accept proposition “B” as false.

[+] more examples

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[+] Example sentences

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:

something that someone intends to do or deal with

Fixing the engine will not be an easy/simple proposition. [=matter]

The election will be a tough proposition for the mayor.

The farm will never be a paying proposition. [=the farm will never make money]

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US

:

a suggestion for a change in the law on which people must vote

The town voted in favor of a proposition calling for a ban on smoking in public spaces.

He expects Proposition 12 to pass by a wide margin.

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2

proposition

/ˌprɑːpəˈzɪʃən/

verb

propositions;

propositioned;

propositioning

2

proposition

/ˌprɑːpəˈzɪʃən/

verb

propositions;

propositioned;

propositioning

Britannica Dictionary definition of PROPOSITION

[+ object]

:

to offer to have sex with (someone) in a direct and often offensive way

He was propositioned by a prostitute.

He got drunk and propositioned a woman sitting next to him in the bar.

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1Historical usage

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1.1By Aristotle

1.2By the logical positivists

1.3By Russell

2Relation to the mind

3Treatment in logic

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3.1Aristotelian logic

3.2Syntactic characterization

3.3Semantic characterization

4Objections to propositions

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6References

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Proposition

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Bearer of truth or falsity

This article is about the term in philosophy. For a theorem of lesser importance, see Proposition (mathematics). For other uses, see Proposition (disambiguation).

Not to be confused with preposition.

This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.Find sources: "Proposition" – news · newspapers · books · scholar · JSTOR (February 2023) (Learn how and when to remove this template message)

A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language, semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary bearer of truth or falsity. Propositions are also often characterized as being the kind of thing that declarative sentences denote. For instance the sentence "The sky is blue" denotes the proposition that the sky is blue. However, crucially, propositions are not themselves linguistic expressions. For instance, the English sentence "Snow is white" denotes the same proposition as the German sentence "Schnee ist weiß" even though the two sentences are not the same. Similarly, propositions can also be characterized as the objects of belief and other propositional attitudes. For instance if one believes that the sky is blue, what one believes is the proposition that the sky is blue. A proposition can also be thought of as a kind of idea: Collins Dictionary has a definition for proposition as "a statement or an idea that people can consider or discuss whether it is true."[1]

Formally, propositions are often modeled as functions which map a possible world to a truth value. For instance, the proposition that the sky is blue can be modeled as a function which would return the truth value

T

{\displaystyle T}

if given the actual world as input, but would return

F

{\displaystyle F}

if given some alternate world where the sky is green. However, a number of alternative formalizations have been proposed, notably the structured propositions view.

Propositions have played a large role throughout the history of logic, linguistics, philosophy of language, and related disciplines. Some researchers have doubted whether a consistent definition of propositionhood is possible, David Lewis even remarking that "the conception we associate with the word ‘proposition’ may be something of a jumble of conflicting desiderata". The term is often used broadly and has been used to refer to various related concepts.

Historical usage[edit]

By Aristotle[edit]

Aristotelian logic identifies a categorical proposition as a sentence which affirms or denies a predicate of a subject, optionally with the help of a copula. An Aristotelian proposition may take the form of "All men are mortal" or "Socrates is a man." In the first example, the subject is "men", predicate is "mortal" and copula is "are", while in the second example, the subject is "Socrates", the predicate is "a man" and copula is "is".[2]

By the logical positivists[edit]

Often, propositions are related to closed formulae (or logical sentence) to distinguish them from what is expressed by an open formula. In this sense, propositions are "statements" that are truth-bearers. This conception of a proposition was supported by the philosophical school of logical positivism.

Some philosophers argue that some (or all) kinds of speech or actions besides the declarative ones also have propositional content. For example, yes–no questions present propositions, being inquiries into the truth value of them. On the other hand, some signs can be declarative assertions of propositions, without forming a sentence nor even being linguistic (e.g. traffic signs convey definite meaning which is either true or false).

Propositions are also spoken of as the content of beliefs and similar intentional attitudes, such as desires, preferences, and hopes. For example, "I desire that I have a new car", or "I wonder whether it will snow" (or, whether it is the case that "it will snow"). Desire, belief, doubt, and so on, are thus called propositional attitudes when they take this sort of content.[3]

By Russell[edit]

Bertrand Russell held that propositions were structured entities with objects and properties as constituents. One important difference between Ludwig Wittgenstein's view (according to which a proposition is the set of possible worlds/states of affairs in which it is true) is that on the Russellian account, two propositions that are true in all the same states of affairs can still be differentiated. For instance, the proposition "two plus two equals four" is distinct on a Russellian account from the proposition "three plus three equals six". If propositions are sets of possible worlds, however, then all mathematical truths (and all other necessary truths) are the same set (the set of all possible worlds).[citation needed]

Relation to the mind[edit]

In relation to the mind, propositions are discussed primarily as they fit into propositional attitudes. Propositional attitudes are simply attitudes characteristic of folk psychology (belief, desire, etc.) that one can take toward a proposition (e.g. 'it is raining,' 'snow is white,' etc.). In English, propositions usually follow folk psychological attitudes by a "that clause" (e.g. "Jane believes that it is raining"). In philosophy of mind and psychology, mental states are often taken to primarily consist in propositional attitudes. The propositions are usually said to be the "mental content" of the attitude. For example, if Jane has a mental state of believing that it is raining, her mental content is the proposition 'it is raining.' Furthermore, since such mental states are about something (namely, propositions), they are said to be intentional mental states.

Explaining the relation of propositions to the mind is especially difficult for non-mentalist views of propositions, such as those of the logical positivists and Russell described above, and Gottlob Frege's view that propositions are Platonist entities, that is, existing in an abstract, non-physical realm.[4] So some recent views of propositions have taken them to be mental. Although propositions cannot be particular thoughts since those are not shareable, they could be types of cognitive events[5] or properties of thoughts (which could be the same across different thinkers).[6]

Philosophical debates surrounding propositions as they relate to propositional attitudes have also recently centered on whether they are internal or external to the agent, or whether they are mind-dependent or mind-independent entities. For more, see the entry on internalism and externalism in philosophy of mind.

Treatment in logic[edit]

Aristotelian logic[edit]

As noted above, in Aristotelian logic a proposition is a particular kind of sentence (a declarative sentence) that affirms or denies a predicate of a subject, optionally with the help of a copula.[2] Aristotelian propositions take forms like "All men are mortal" and "Socrates is a man."

Syntactic characterization[edit]

In modern logic, the term "proposition" is often used for sentences of a formal language. In this usage, propositions are formal syntactic objects which can be studied independently of the meaning they would receive from a semantics. Propositions are also called sentences, statements, statement forms, formulas, and well-formed formulas, though these terms are usually not synonymous within a single text.

A formal language begins with different types of symbols. These types can include variables, operators, function symbols, predicate (or relation) symbols, quantifiers, and propositional constants.(Grouping symbols such as delimiters are often added for convenience in using the language, but do not play a logical role.) Symbols are concatenated together according to recursive rules, in order to construct strings to which truth-values will be assigned. The rules specify how the operators, function and predicate symbols, and quantifiers are to be concatenated with other strings. A proposition is then a string with a specific form. The form that a proposition takes depends on the type of logic.

The type of logic called propositional, sentential, or statement logic includes only operators and propositional constants as symbols in its language. The propositions in this language are propositional constants, which are considered atomic propositions, and composite (or compound) propositions,[7] which are composed by recursively applying operators to propositions. Application here is simply a short way of saying that the corresponding concatenation rule has been applied.

The types of logics called predicate, quantificational, or n-order logic include variables, operators, predicate and function symbols, and quantifiers as symbols in their languages. The propositions in these logics are more complex. First, one typically starts by defining a term as follows:

A variable, or

A function symbol applied to the number of terms required by the function symbol's arity.

For example, if + is a binary function symbol and x, y, and z are variables, then x+(y+z) is a term, which might be written with the symbols in various orders. Once a term is defined, a proposition can then be defined as follows:

A predicate symbol applied to the number of terms required by its arity, or

An operator applied to the number of propositions required by its arity, or

A quantifier applied to a proposition.

For example, if = is a binary predicate symbol and ∀ is a quantifier, then ∀x,y,z [(x = y) → (x+z = y+z)] is a proposition. This more complex structure of propositions allows these logics to make finer distinctions between inferences, i.e., to have greater expressive power.

Semantic characterization[edit]

Propositions are standardly understood semantically as indicator functions that take a possible world and return a truth value. For example, the proposition that the sky is blue could be represented as a function

f

{\displaystyle f}

such that

f

(

w

)

=

T

{\displaystyle f(w)=T}

for every world

w

,

{\displaystyle w,}

if any, where the sky is blue, and

f

(

v

)

=

F

{\displaystyle f(v)=F}

for every world

v

,

{\displaystyle v,}

if any, where it is not. A proposition can be modeled equivalently with the inverse image of

T

{\displaystyle T}

under the indicator function, which is sometimes called the characteristic set of the proposition. For instance, if

w

{\displaystyle w}

and

w

{\displaystyle w'}

are the only worlds in which the sky is blue, the proposition that the sky is blue could be modeled as the set

{

w

,

w

}

{\displaystyle \{w,w'\}}

.[8][9][10][11]

Numerous refinements and alternative notions of proposition-hood have been proposed including inquisitive propositions and structured propositions.[12][9] Propositions are called structured propositions if they have constituents, in some broad sense.[3][13] Assuming a structured view of propositions, one can distinguish between singular propositions (also Russellian propositions, named after Bertrand Russell) which are about a particular individual, general propositions, which are not about any particular individual, and particularized propositions, which are about a particular individual but do not contain that individual as a constituent.[14]

Objections to propositions[edit]

Attempts to provide a workable definition of proposition include the following:

Two meaningful declarative sentences express the same proposition, if and only if they mean the same thing.[citation needed]

which defines proposition in terms of synonymity. For example, "Snow is white" (in English) and "Schnee ist weiß" (in German) are different sentences, but they say the same thing, so they express the same proposition. Another definition of proposition is:

Two meaningful declarative sentence-tokens express the same proposition, if and only if they mean the same thing.[citation needed]

The above definitions can result in two identical sentences/sentence-tokens appearing to have the same meaning, and thus expressing the same proposition and yet having different truth-values, as in "I am Spartacus" said by Spartacus and said by John Smith, and "It is Wednesday" said on a Wednesday and on a Thursday. These examples reflect the problem of ambiguity in common language, resulting in a mistaken equivalence of the statements. “I am Spartacus” spoken by Spartacus is the declaration that the individual speaking is called Spartacus and it is true. When spoken by John Smith, it is a declaration about a different speaker and it is false. The term “I” means different things, so “I am Spartacus” means different things.

A related problem is when identical sentences have the same truth-value, yet express different propositions. The sentence “I am a philosopher” could have been spoken by both Socrates and Plato. In both instances, the statement is true, but means something different.

These problems are addressed in predicate logic by using a variable for the problematic term, so that “X is a philosopher” can have Socrates or Plato substituted for X, illustrating that “Socrates is a philosopher” and “Plato is a philosopher” are different propositions. Similarly, “I am Spartacus” becomes “X is Spartacus”, where X is replaced with terms representing the individuals Spartacus and John Smith.

In other words, the example problems can be averted if sentences are formulated with precision such that their terms have unambiguous meanings.

A number of philosophers and linguists claim that all definitions of a proposition are too vague to be useful. For them, it is just a misleading concept that should be removed from philosophy and semantics. W. V. Quine, who granted the existence of sets in mathematics,[15] maintained that the indeterminacy of translation prevented any meaningful discussion of propositions, and that they should be discarded in favor of sentences.[16] P. F. Strawson, on the other hand, advocated for the use of the term "statement".

See also[edit]

Philosophy portal

Categorical proposition

Probabilistic proposition

References[edit]

^ "Collins Dictionary". Archived from the original on 2017-11-26.

^ a b Groarke, Louis. "Aristotle: Logic — From Words into Propositions". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 2019-12-10.

^ a b McGrath, Matthew; Frank, Devin. "Propositions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)". Plato.stanford.edu. Retrieved 2014-06-23.

^ Balaguer, Mark (2016). "Platonism in metaphysics: Propositions". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 30 June 2021.

^ Soames, Scott (2014). "Propositions as cognitive event types" (PDF). In King, Jeffrey C.; Soames, Scott; Speaks, Jeff (eds.). New Thinking about Propositions. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199693764.

^ Joaquin, Jeremiah Joven B.; Franklin, James (2021). "A causal-mentalist view of propositions". Organon F. 28. Retrieved 30 June 2021.

^ "Mathematics | Introduction to Propositional Logic | Set 1". GeeksforGeeks. 2015-06-19. Retrieved 2019-12-11.

^ Gamut, L.T.F. (1991). Logic, Language and Meaning: Intensional Logic and Logical Grammar. University of Chicago Press. p. 122. ISBN 0-226-28088-8.

^ a b King, Jeffrey (2019), "Structured Propositions", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, Section 2, retrieved 2022-12-30

^ Irene Heim; Angelika Kratzer (1998). Semantics in generative grammar. Wiley-Blackwell. p. 304. ISBN 978-0-631-19713-3.

^ Stalnaker, Robert (1972). "Pragmatics". In Davidson, Donald; Harman, Gilbert (eds.). Semantics. p. 381.

^ Ciardelli, Ivano; Groenendijk, Jeroen; Roelofsen, Floris (2019). Inquisitive Semantics. Oxford University Press. pp. 13, 20–22. ISBN 9780198814795.

^ Fitch, Greg; Nelson, Michael (2018), "Singular Propositions", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2019-12-11

^ Structured Propositions by Jeffrey C. King

^ McGrath, Matthew; Frank, Devin (2018), "Propositions", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2020-08-20

^ Quine, W. V. (1970). Philosophy of Logic. NJ USA: Prentice-Hall. pp. 1–14. ISBN 0-13-663625-X.

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Works

Cratylus (n.d.)

Port-Royal Grammar (1660)

De Arte Combinatoria (1666)

An Essay Towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language (1668)

Alciphron (1732)

"On Denoting" (1905)

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921)

Language, Truth, and Logic (1936)

Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951)

Philosophical Investigations (1953)

Of Grammatology (1967)

Naming and Necessity (1980)

Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982)

Limited Inc (1988)

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Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Proposition&oldid=1195425136"

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proposition noun - Definition, pictures, pronunciation and usage notes | Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary at OxfordLearnersDictionaries.com

proposition noun - Definition, pictures, pronunciation and usage notes | Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary at OxfordLearnersDictionaries.com

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Definition of proposition noun from the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary

proposition noun OPAL W  /ˌprɒpəˈzɪʃn/  /ˌprɑːpəˈzɪʃn/

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 an idea or a plan of action that is suggested, especially in businessI'd like to put a business proposition to you.He was trying to make it look like an attractive proposition.Extra ExamplesRing up your agent in New York and put your proposition to him.Is that a viable proposition?We have a proposition to make.Topics Suggestions and advicec1Oxford Collocations Dictionaryadjectiveattractivetemptingwin-win…verb + propositionput to somebodyconsideraccept…See full entry

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 a thing that you intend to do; a problem, task or person to be dealt with synonym matterGetting a work permit in the UK is not always a simple proposition.Extra ExamplesRunning the business was one thing. Getting it to make a profit was a different proposition altogether.He's a different proposition from his father—much less tolerant.Oxford Collocations Dictionaryadjectivedifficulttoughtricky…See full entry

(also Proposition) (in the US) a suggested change to the law that people can vote onHow did you vote on Proposition 8?Topics Politicsc1 (formal) a statement that expresses an opinionHer assessment is based on the proposition that power corrupts.The book puts forward a number of extreme propositions about the nature of language.Topics Opinion and argumentc1Oxford Collocations Dictionaryadjectivebasiccentralfundamental…… of propositionssetverb + propositionadvanceexpressput forward…proposition + verbconcern somethingrelate to somethingprepositionproposition aboutSee full entry (mathematics) a statement of a theorem, and an explanation of how it can be provedFirst of all we need to examine whether this proposition is true. Word OriginMiddle English: from Old French, from Latin propositio(n-), from the verb proponere ‘set forth’, from pro- ‘forward’ + ponere ‘put’.See proposition in the Oxford Advanced American DictionarySee proposition in the Oxford Learner's Dictionary of Academic EnglishCheck pronunciation:

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proposition | meaning of proposition in Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English | LDOCE

proposition | meaning of proposition in Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English | LDOCE

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proposition From Longman Dictionary of Contemporary EnglishRelated topics: Law, Mathspropositionprop‧o‧si‧tion1 /ˌprɒpəˈzɪʃən $ ˌprɑː-/ ●○○ noun [countable]

 

 1 statementSUGGEST a statement that consists of a carefully considered opinion or judgmentproposition that

 Most people accept the proposition that we have a duty to protect endangered animals.

 The theory is founded on two basic propositions.2 suggestionSUGGEST a suggestion, or something that is suggested or considered as a possible thing to do

 He telephoned Stuart with a proposition.attractive/interesting/practical etc proposition

 The offer of two tickets for the price of one makes it a very attractive proposition.

 It doesn’t sound like a very viable proposition to me.

 I’ve got a proposition to put to you. 3 → be a different/tricky/simple etc proposition 4 law (also Proposition)SCL a suggested change or addition to the law of a state of the US, which citizens vote on

 Proposition 1475 mathematics technicalHM something that must be proved, or a question to which the answer must be found – used in geometry —propositional adjectiveCOLLOCATIONS – Meaning 2: a suggestion, or something that is suggested or considered as a possible thing to doverbsput a proposition to somebody (also make (somebody) a proposition)A proposition was put to Owen, and he is considering it.I’m going to make you a proposition.ADJECTIVES/NOUN + propositiona business propositionDoes this mean you’ve changed your mind about my business proposition?a commercial proposition (=likely to be financially successful)Gold mining is not a commercial proposition here.an attractive propositionSetting up your own business is a very attractive proposition.an interesting propositionA further study focussing on older people is an interesting proposition.a practical/viable proposition (=likely to be possible or successful)A complete ban on strikes is not a practical proposition.

Examples from the Corpusproposition• Proposition 209 outlawed affirmative action in California.• I have a proposition to make.• I am left with the cup the idea of that ordinary physical object - or a proposition about the cup.• It's a proposition - a business proposition.• However, all this makes the Rolls a more costly proposition if it needs repairing.• Inevitably this raises a question about the logical structure of existential propositions in general.• We are prepared to look at any reasonable proposition from the council.• Most of Aristotle's propositions have proven wrong over time.• But as the centennial neared, he approached Fred with quite a secular proposition.• Those behind the proposition are a group of hard-working volunteers who want to improve Tucson.• Film theorists first put forward the proposition that the construction of the spectator in mainstream cinema is gendered.• We're still studying the proposition.• It would be difficult to sustain this proposition.• I'll consider your proposition and let you know. proposition that• There are certain simple classes of true arithmetical proposition that do form recursively enumerable sets, however.• Erling has based his legal defense on the proposition that the photos of him are fake.• First then the proposition that management should accept a responsibility for doing everything possible to keep prices stable or to reduce them.• Let us begin with the proposition that our visual experience does somehow involve a judgement.• The proposition that the fabliau is an appropriate mode for an argument between two churls is explicitly Chaucer's.

proposition ... put to• I told you I had a proposition to put to you.• Quite apart from anything else, I have a business proposition to put to you.• Desmond took his time, and when he finally arrived and the proposition was put to him, he shook his head.propositionproposition2 verb [transitive] formal

 

 SEX/HAVE SEX WITHto suggest to someone that they have sex with you

 Here, prostitutes constantly proposition tourists. → See Verb tableExamples from the Corpusproposition• Even she, who'd been propositioned by experts, had to admit that.• I was propositioned by this absolutely stunning girl who couldn't have been any more than seventeen.• She complained that her boss propositioned her on several occasions.• Had Puddephat provoked this storm by propositioning the boy?• His parishioners had grumbled that streetwalkers propositioned them after his sermons.From Longman Business Dictionarypropositionprop‧o‧si‧tion /ˌprɒpəˈzɪʃənˌprɑː-/ noun [countable]1COMMERCEa business idea, offer, or suggestion, for example a possible business dealI’ll consider your proposition and let you know my decision next week.We have a proposition to make.It is an attractive proposition. → value proposition2 (also Proposition)LAW in the US, a suggested change to the law of a state, which citizens vote onProposition 13, passed by California voters in 1978, requires that any new special taxes be approved by at least two-thirds of the voters.3a statement that consists of a carefully considered opinion or judgementKondratiev’s basic proposition was that the advanced capitalist economies go through regular cycles of booms and slumps (=ups and downs).proposition thatThe proposition that the world economy is a system means that all parts are in one way or another dependent on each other.

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Verb tablepropositionSimple FormPresentI, you, we, theypropositionhe, she, itpropositions

> View More

PastI, you, he, she, it, we, theypropositionedPresent perfectI, you, we, theyhave propositionedhe, she, ithas propositionedPast perfectI, you, he, she, it, we, theyhad propositionedFutureI, you, he, she, it, we, theywill propositionFuture perfectI, you, he, she, it, we, theywill have propositioned

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Continuous FormPresentIam propositioninghe, she, itis propositioning

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you, we, theyare propositioningPastI, he, she, itwas propositioningyou, we, theywere propositioningPresent perfectI, you, we, theyhave been propositioninghe, she, ithas been propositioningPast perfectI, you, he, she, it, we, theyhad been propositioningFutureI, you, he, she, it, we, theywill be propositioningFuture perfectI, you, he, she, it, we, theywill have been propositioning

> View Less

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